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Abstract
Large scale cryptocurrencies require the participation of millions of participants and support economic
activity of billions of dollars, which has led to new lines of work in binary Byzantine Agreement (BBA)
and consensus. The new work aims to achieve communication-efficiency—given such a large n, not
everyone can speak during the protocol. Several protocols have achieved consensus with communication-
efficiency, even under an adaptive adversary, but they require additional strong assumptions—proof-of-
work, memory-erasure, etc. All of these protocols use multicast: every honest replica multicasts messages
to all other replicas. Under this model, we provide a new communication-efficient consensus protocol
using Verifiable Delay Functions (VDFs) that is secure against adaptive adversaries and does not require
the same strong assumptions present in other protocols.
A natural question is whether we can extend the synchronous protocols to the partially synchronous
setting—in this work, we show that using multicast, we cannot. Furthermore, we cannot achieve always
safe communication-efficient protocols (that maintain safety with probability 1) even in the synchronous
setting against a static adversary when honest replicas only choose to multicast its messages. Considering
these impossibility results, we describe a new communication-efficient BBA protocol in a modified
partially synchronous network model which is secure against adaptive adversaries with high probability. 1
1 Introduction
Consensus is a fundamental problem in distributed systems. Historically, consensus protocols have been
critical in the context of ensuring the consistency of replicated data [CGR07, CWO+11, BGS+11], but they
were typically deployed with only a few dozen replicas and only tolerated crash failures. More recently,
consensus protocols have been studied in the context of cryptocurrencies to maintain a distributed public
ledger. These applications introduce new demands: First, cryptocurrency networks operate with thousands or
millions of participants (large n), meaning n2 communication complexity is unacceptable. Second, these
ledgers support billions of dollars of economic activity, so they need to cope with a much stronger potential
attacker.
Recent work addresses this goal of consensus with subquadratric communication complexity while
tolerating adaptive adversaries, but these works require strong additional assumptions: Nakamoto’s elegant
longest chain protocol [N+08] relies on idealized proof-of-work, which has led to energy-intensive mining.
Algorand [GHM+17] and Ouroborous Praos [DGKR18] require honest users to erase their private keys from
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memory before sending a message, known as the memory-erasure model, which can be difficult to ensure in
practice. [CPS19] uses a primitive called batch agreement which puts semantic requirements on agreement
values, meaning it is impractical to use in the cryptocurrency context. In light of these restrictions, we seek to
answer the following question:
What communication-efficient consensus protocols secure against adaptive adversaries can we
obtain without strong cryptographic assumptions, and what are the limitations to obtaining these
protocols?
Addressing this in even a synchronous network is challenging because most known communication-
efficient protocols use committee election; proposals and voting are done by a leader and small committee
which are elected uniformly at random. Typically the size is much smaller than the tolerated number of
faults, so an adaptive adversary can simply corrupt the leader and entire committee, and vote for two values:
we call this key reuse. Memory-erasure is one technique to eliminate key reuse; another is vote-specific
eligibility where election is dependent probabilistically on the proposed value, so the adversary cannot force a
compromised leader and committee to vote for another value (with high probability). Unfortunately, in these
protocols the adversary can use computational power to bias the elections: we call this vote grinding. In the
case of public ledgers, honest replicas will only propose transactions sent to them by clients, which means
that honest replicas do not have a disproportionate chance to become part of the committee. The adversary,
on the other hand, can create and try many different arbitrary transactions, for example spending coins back
to itself, to increase the chances that Byzantine replicas are elected to committees.
Our solution is to make key reuse expensive by using Verifiable Delay Functions (VDFs) [BBBF18]
to make it temporally expensive to send multiple votes. Leaders and committees are elected in such a
way that there is no opportunity for vote grinding. Note that VDFs are proofs of sequential computation,
meaning participants do not benefit from having parallel computational resources; this is quite different from
proofs-of-work.
Extending these protocols to operate in a partially synchronous network (where a network is asynchronous
until an unknown, but finite global stabilization time is reached) introduces new challenges. During a long
enough asynchronous period the adversary can drop messages and force repeated elections until eventually a
long sequence of leaders and committees are elected where the adversary has an advantage. We call this
attack fast-forwarding. At this point the adversary can propose and vote for multiple proposals, violating
safety. This is the reason why, even for our linear multicast protocol in Appendix B, we require a bound on
the number of rounds the asynchronous period can last. This, among other reasons, is the motivation for
developing a new partially synchronous model and a protocol in the modified partially synchronous network
in Section 7.
1.1 Summary of Contributions
In this section, we describe the main results we present in this paper.
Main Result 1: Limitations of Communication-Efficient Protocols using Multicast (Section 5). Thus
far, most currently known and implemented communication-efficient protocols (e.g. [ACD+19, CPS19,
GHM+17]) have all honest replicas communicate with other replicas in the network via multicasts (or
broadcasts). In other words, every message that an honest replica sends is broadcasted to all other replicas in
the network. First, we show that in such protocols where honest replicas only multicast messages (and do not
perform point-to-point communication), it is impossible to achieve a communication-efficient protocol even
under static adversaries in the synchronous model where safety is always guaranteed. We prove our result for
binary Byzantine Agreement (BBA), which means it also holds for consensus.
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Theorem (informal). It is impossible to formulate a communication-efficient protocol for binary Byzantine
agreement that always guarantees safety (safety is guaranteed with probability 1) while tolerating even a
static adversary in the synchronous network model, when honest replicas multicast messages.
Ideally we could maintain communication-efficiency with high probability (or liveness in polylogarithmic
rounds with high probability) but always maintain safety with probability 1. We hope our impossibility result
might motivate researchers to investigate communication-efficient protocols which do not require all honest
nodes to multicast all messages. An important open question is whether using point-to-point messages can
lead to communication-efficient protocols where safety is always maintained or whether this impossibility
result also extends to protocols which use point-to-point communication.
Second, we extend an impossibility result given in [ACD+19] to show that it is impossible to formulate a
communication-efficient binary Byzantine agreement protocol that achieves agreement with high probability
in the partially synchronous model (with global stabilization times) as defined in [DLS88], even with
synchronous processors (only message delays are asynchronous).
Theorem (informal). It is impossible to formulate a communication-efficient protocol for binary Byzan-
tine agreement in the partially synchronous model (even when processors are synchronous) that achieves
agreement with high probability against an adaptive adversary when honest replicas multicast messages.
Thus, it seems fruitful to look for alternative models of partial synchrony modeled after the GST model
provided in [DLS88] to achieve communication-efficiency. We do so in our third main result.
Main Result 2: Consensus using VDFs (Section 6). We introduce a new randomized communication-
efficient consensus protocol based on Verifiable Delay Functions (VDFs) that is safe even against (weakly)
adaptive adversaries in the synchronous model. This protocol does not require proof-of-work or the memory-
erasure model and can withstand the case when adversaries can arbitrarily choose the inputs of Byzantine
nodes as well as the transactions and proposals of each such node.
Theorem (informal). Suppose honest replicas can compute a VDF with difficulty D in δhD time and
Byzantine replicas can compute the same VDF in δadvD time. There exists a communication-efficient
consensus protocol for any positive constants δh and δadv that reaches consensus in O (log n) rounds even in
the presence of adaptive adversaries in the synchronous model with overwhelming probability (in the security
parameter κ) and high probability in n assuming the total number of replicas is ≥ 3f + 1 where f is the
number of Byzantine replicas.
Intuitively, VDFs guarantee that obtaining the output of the function given an input requires some number
D of sequential steps (for a D chosen when the function is initialized) even when parallel processors are
available. Verifying the output of such a function only requires O(logD) steps. Although VDFs require
sequential computation, this amount of computation is vastly less than the computation necessary to perform
proofs-of-work since the ability for adversaries to parallelize the work has been eliminated (so more hardware–
up to reasonable sizes–does not imply a bigger advantage). We use VDFs instead of the memory-erasure
model assumptions to protect against adaptive adversarial corruptions of important proposers and committees.
The adversary must compute a VDF in order to send more messages. However, we must solve some number
of challenges including when adversaries can potentially have fast VDF solvers that take some constant
fraction of the amount of time required by VDF solvers held by honest replicas. A description of these
challenges and their solutions are presented in Section 6.
Main Result 3: Communication-Efficiency under Adaptive Adversaries in the Partially Synchronous
with Randomly Dropped Messages Model (Section 7). Due to our impossibility results, it seems nec-
essary to relax the assumptions of the partially synchronous model slightly in order to obtain meaningful
3
communication-efficient protocols for binary Byzantine agreement. Thus, we formulate the partially syn-
chronous with randomly dropped messages network model where during the asynchronous period, each
message has probability p of being dropped. Thus, the adversary no longer is able to selectively drop messages
during the asynchronous period. We show that in this model, we can have a communication-efficient protocol
using honest multicast that reaches agreement with high probability.
Theorem (informal). There exists a communication-efficient protocol which reaches binary Byzantine
agreement in O (poly log n) rounds after GST with high probability in the partially synchronous with
randomly dropped messages network model under (weakly) adaptive adversaries.
2 Related Work
2.1 Consensus Protocols and Adaptive Adversaries
Consensus Protocol Network Model Multicast Complexity Assumptions
Algorand
[GHM+17]
Synchronous O(poly(log n)) Memory-erasure, PKI
Herding [CPS19] Synchronous O(poly(log n))
Filtering transactions
by age, PKI
Ouroboros
[DGKR18]
Semi-Synchronous O(poly(log(κ))) Memory-erasure, PKI
Nakamoto [N+08] Synchronous O(poly(log(κ))) Proof of Work
[ACD+20]
Partially Synchronous
(Fixed, but unknown ∆)
O(poly(log(n))) BBA, PKI
This work Synchronous O(poly(log n)) VDFs, PKI
This work
Partially Synchronous
Randomly Dropped
Messages
O(poly(log n)) BBA, PKI
Table 1: Comparison to related work on randomized, communication-efficient consensus protocols that
tolerate adaptive adversaries.
Traditional consensus protocols [DS83, DLS88] require all replicas to send messages to all other replicas,
resulting in O(n2) communication complexity in a network with n replicas. Because they have such large
communication complexity, most of these protocols can be modified to account for adaptive adversaries.
Some [ADD+19, DS83, KK09] can even be shown to be secure for strongly adaptive adversaries that can
perform after-the-fact removal. However, for our intended application to large-scale distributed systems such
as decentralized cryptocurrencies, we would like protocols with lower communication complexities.
Leader election-based consensus protocols [CL99, YMR+19] reduce communication complexity by
electing a single leader per round who aggregates votes. These protocols do not easily tolerate an adaptive
adversary. HotStuff [YMR+19], using a 3-round pipelined protocol, uses signature aggregation techniques
to reduce authenticator complexity (number of digital signatures or message authentication codes sent in
messages) to O(n). HotStuff also has the nice property of responsiveness; it proceeds at actual network
delay instead of worst case network delay. We use HotStuff’s clever 3-round protocol in both our syn-
chronous consensus protocol (Section 6) and in our partially synchronous clock synchronization protocols
(Appendix B,Section 7). However, a straightforward application of HotStuff is not sufficient to achieve
subquadratic message complexity while tolerating adaptive adversaries: an adversary could continually
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corrupt the leader for at least n/3 rounds, forcing a quadratic number of messages before finding an honest
leader and reaching agreement. A primary contribution of our work is showing how to prevent these types of
attacks.
Other recent works have been able to lower the communication complexity by using additional techniques.
The breakthrough work of King and Saia [KS11] presented a binary Byzantine Agreement protocol in the
adaptive adversaries setting with communication complexity O
(
n1.5
)
with the assumption of authenticated
channels. As in Algorand and Micali-Vaikuntanathan [GHM+17, MV17], King and Saia [KS11] also assume
that replicas can securely erase secrets from memory. Other works like the sleepy model of consensus [PS17]
and Ouroboros [DGKR18] also use the memory-erasure model. As discussed in Canetti et al. [CEGL08],
erasures are hard to perform in real software.
The famous Nakamoto consensus protocol [GKL15, N+08, PSS17, Ren19] achieves O(n poly log(κ))
communication complexity assuming perfect proof-of-work in the synchronous model even under adaptive
adversaries. This work proposed what is known as the longest-chain strategy, which results in eventual
consensus. More recent protocols [DPS19, DGKR18, KR18, KRDO17, PS17, Shi19] also follow Nakamoto’s
longest-chain strategy but unlike Nakamoto consensus, they remove the proof-of-work assumptions by using
a permissioned setting with a public-key infrastructure. In these protocols, a replica has some chance of
being elected as leader in each round. When a replica is elected as leader, it signs the block extending the
current longest chain. For such protocols to exhibit both safety and liveness, some additional constraints have
to be imposed on the validity of the timestamps contained in the blockchain. However, these works do not
guarantee small turnover time for adaptive adversaries if the memory-erasure model is not used regardless of
whether the leader election is randomized [DPS19, KRDO17, PS17] or deterministic [KR18, Shi19]. In fact,
the number of rounds to consensus could be near-linear since the adaptive adversary can continuously corrupt
the small number of players who talk.
A key way to achieve communication-efficiency is electing a small (O(poly log n)-sized) committee to
run a step of the protocol [GHM+17, ACD+19, CPS19, DGKR18, DPS19, HMW18]. This committee is
much smaller than the typical n/2−  or n/3−  ideal number of corruptions to tolerate, and as such, the
adversary can compromise safety by corrupting the entire committee and voting for two different values at
the same time. Algorand gets around this using memory-erasure; keys are ephemeral and thus not available to
vote for another value [GHM+17, MV17]. [ACD+19] tolerates an adaptive adversary for binary Byzantine
Agreement by leveraging the innovative idea of vote-specific eligibility: by tying voting eligibility to the
proposal, the adversary cannot simply compromise the leader and elected committee after they send a
message and force them to vote for two values at the same time. This is because most likely, the proposers
and/or committees for the two values will be different (or have very small overlap); thus compromising
one committee for one proposal does not ensure committee membership for a different proposal. Though
this works for binary Byzantine Agreement, it does not extend to consensus for general values because
it introduces what we call vote grinding: the adversary can try many different input values to influence
committee selection and create a biased committee, as noted in [CPS19]. In an updated version of their work,
they provide a BBA protocol that works in a partially synchronous network, however, they use a different
model where ∆ is fixed but unknown, while our lower bound is in the model where ∆ only holds after a
Global Stabilization Time (GST) [ACD+20].
Chan, Pass, and Shi [CPS19] nicely build on ideas from both of these works and achieve communication-
efficient consensus with an adaptive adversary using vote-specific eligibility and the novel idea of batch
agreement: transactions, batched together in a block proposal, are scored according to when the replica
first saw the transaction; older transactions score higher than new. The adversary cannot try many different
values to influence the committee because honest participants will only vote for the highest-scoring block.
Unfortunately, it is unclear how this might work in practice; many blockchains sort transactions by fees
instead of first-seen in order to rate limit and deter spam [N+08, W+14]. Straightforwardly sorting by
transaction fee instead of age in [CPS19] would mean that an attacker could continuously create many
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self-spending high-fee transactions and send them to different honest replicas, making the honest replicas
disagree on the highest scoring block. Unlike what occurs with old transactions (at some point, everyone
agrees on the set of oldest transactions), adversaries can keep on generating different higher-fee transactions,
leading to indefinite disagreements. Table 1 summarizes the differences between our work and these other
communication-efficient consensus protocols that tolerate adaptive adversaries.
Other works [CCGZ19, GKKZ11, HZ10] have looked at adversaries whose corrupting powers are delayed
by a round but for Byzantine Broadcast, which is a different problem than what is considered in this paper.
They have focused on a simulation-based notion of adaptive security for Byzantine Broadcast, where the
concern is that the adversary should not be able to observe what the sender wants to broadcast, and then
adaptively corrupt the sender to flip the bit. They use what is called the atomic message model where after
adaptively corrupting a replica i the adversary cannot erase the message i already sent this round and also
must wait for at least one maximum network delay before the corrupt i can start sending corrupt messages.
2.2 Lower Bounds for Binary Byzantine Agreement Protocols
Work Type Network Model Adversary Lower Bound Even Assuming
[ACD+19] any any
Strongly
Adaptive
Ω(f2) PKI
[DR85] Deterministic any
Static or
stronger
Ω(f2)
Authenticated
Channels
This work any
any (safety
guaranteed with
probability 1)
Static or
stronger
Ω(f2) PKI
This work any
Partially
Synchronous
(GST)
Adaptive Ω(f2) PKI
Table 2: Comparison to related work on BBA lower bounds.
Previously, Abraham et al. [ACD+19] have shown that (possibly randomized) protocols that achieve
subquadratic message complexity cannot tolerate a strongly-adaptive adversary. The proof of their lower
bound is inspired by Dolev and Reischuk [DR85] who showed that any deterministic consensus protocol must
incur Ω(f2) communication complexity when assuming authenticated channels. Abraham et al. [ACD+19]
also show that without a PKI, no protocol with C(κ, n) multicast complexity can achieve consensus under
C(κ, n) adaptive corruptions even in the synchronous model, when assuming the existence of a random
oracle or a common reference string, and even in the memory-erasure model. Table 2 compares these lower
bounds to ours. Some other works have achieved expected quadratic communication complexity under
various settings that are similar to adaptive adversarial settings [AMN+19, AMS19] in modified synchronous
and asynchronous models.
Other Lower Bound Results Previously, [CMS89, KY84] showed that any randomized r-round protocol
must fail with probabilite at least (c · r)−r for some constant c; in particular, randomized agreement with sub-
constant failure probability cannot be achieved in strictly constant rounds. Attiya and Censor-Hillel [AC08]
extended the results of [CMS89, KY84] on guaranteed termination of randomized BA protocols to the
asynchronous setting, and provided a tight lower bound. Much more recently, following a series of works
looking at lower bounds on the expected number of rounds necessary to achieve Byzantine agreement
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of randomized protocols, Cohen et al. [CHM+19] show that BA protocols resilient against n/3 adaptive
corruptions terminate at the end of the first round with o(1) probability among other results.
2.3 Consensus with Verifiable Delay Functions
Verifiable Delay Functions (VDFs) were first introduced in [BBBF18], with a related precursor in [LW15].
Newer blockchain protocols use VDFs in consensus protocols (with various other assumptions) as an
unbiasable source of randomness or as a source of timing to progress rounds [AMM18, Dra, CP19]. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to use Verifiable Delay Functions not as a source of randomness
(leader and committee election are independent of VDF output) but to bound the number of messages an
adversary can send, specifically with the purpose of deterring adaptive corruptions.
3 Model
There are n participants in the network and the public keys of all participants are common knowledge. We
only consider systems consisting of n ≥ 3f + 1 replicas where f is the maximum number of Byzantine
replicas present in the system for the duration of the protocol.
Network In this paper, we only consider protocols (in both our impossibility results and our protocol
formulations) where the honest replicas multicast their messages. Consistent with the termininology given
in [ACD+19] and [CPS19], we use the term multicast to indicate when a replica sends a message to all
replicas in the network. Henceforth, we talk about the communication complexity2 in terms of the multicast
complexity (i.e. the number of multicasts)3 as opposed to the point-to-point communication complexity as
conventionally stated in the literature. Honest replicas multicast all messages, but Byzantine nodes may send
point-to-point messages to anyone in the network. This means our goal is to achieve sublinear multicast
complexity, or subquadratic communication complexity. Replicas communicate with each other in a network
via authenticated channels. In Section 6, we are operating in the synchronous network model; the protocol
proceeds in rounds and channels may exhibit communication delay which we model as ∆. Messages reach
their intended recipient after up to ∆ delay. In Section 5 and Appendix B, we consider a partially synchronous
network where communication delay is unbounded until some Global Stabilization Time (GST) after which
delay is bounded by ∆. 4
Protocol Execution We assume as in [ACD+19, CPS19] that honest replicas interact with some environ-
ment Z(1κ) (where κ is the security parameter) that sends them inputs at the beginning of every round, and
honest replicas may send outputs to the environment Z at the end of every round. We assume that honest
replicas attempt to reach consensus on one of the inputs they received from Z at the beginning of the protocol.
Honest replicas follow the protocol when determining their outputs/messages.
We assume that Byzantine replicas are controlled by some adversary A(1κ) which reads each of their
inputs, received messages, and has accesss to their internal states. Then, A(1κ) decides the Byzantine
replicas’ outputs/messages. Crucially, the outputs/messages sent by Byzantine replicas could have no relation
2Consistent with the terminology used in [ACD+19], we refer to communication complexity as the total number of messages sent
in the network by honest replicas. Unlike other commonly used notions of communication complexity, we are not referring to the
total number of bits sent in the network.
3Note here that we explicitly count only the number of multicasts as opposed to the total number of bits sent in all messages. This
is due to the fact that all messages sent by networks using a PKI require signatures of size poly(κ) under standard cryptographic
assumptions. Furthermore, it is difficult to standardize such a measure as the number of bits of a message also depends on the size of
the proposal/transaction/function/etc.
4There are also several other partially synchronous models of consensus, which we do not consider in this paper.
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to the inputs received by these replicas. Such replicas can output/send any number of arbitrary messages
independent of what they receive from Z .
Adversary Throughout this paper, we only consider adaptive adversaries, although one of our impossibility
results holds even for static adversaries. While static adversaries can only corrupt up to f replicas before the
start of the protocol, adaptive adversaries are defined as adversaries A which can corrupt up to f replicas
adaptively, at any point during the execution. When an adaptive adversary corrupts a replica that was
previously honest, it gains access to the replica’s internal state (including its private key), and, henceforth,
A controls the corrupted replica. A corrupted replica remains Byzantine for the remainder of the execution
of the protocol. A does not have access to the internal states of the honest replicas. We assume that A also
has polynomially bounded parallel processing power and cannot guess the secret keys of honest replicas
with high probability. 5 A can coordinate the Byzantine replicas, and can read all messages sent through the
network, but cannot erase or alter messages sent by honest replicas.6
As in [ACD+19], we define replicas which are honest at the current time to be so-far honest, and replicas
which remain honest till the end of the protocol to be forever honest. We also assume that in the synchronous
model, A can reorder the messages received by any replica and can delay any message an arbitrary amount of
time ≤ ∆. In the partially synchronous model, we assume that A can selective choose arbitrarily large delays
for messages during the asynchronous phase and can drop or reorder any number of messages during that
phase. After GST, we assume A follows the behaviours of a synchronous adversary.
Agreement Conditions In the adaptive adversary model, all forever-honest replicas must agree on exactly
one input given to a forever-honest replica by Z at the beginning of the protocol, with high probability with
respect to the number of nodes in the protocol n and the security parameter κ. 7 More specifically, a correct
protocol in our paper maintains the following two safety and liveness guarantees:
1. Safety: No two honest replicas commit to two different values with high probability with respect to n
and κ.
2. Liveness: The protocol terminates in O(poly log(n)) rounds w.h.p. with respect to n and κ.
Additional background on the network and adversarial models, as well as a more detailed explanation of
the challenges facing protocol designers can be found in Appendix E.
4 Preliminaries
The protocols and impossibility results discussed in this paper rely on two main cryptographic primitives:
verifiable random functions (VRFs) and verifiable delay functions (VDFs). We assume standard cryptographic
assumptions. We first define the cryptographic primitives we need in this paper and then define the various
other notation we use throughout the paper.
4.1 Cryptographic Primitives
For all of our protocols, we assume that a trusted setup phase is first used to generate a public-key infrastructure
(PKI) where each replica i ∈ [n] obtains a cryptographic sortition public key/private key pair: (pki, ski)
(such a key pair could be a verifiable random function (VRF) [MVR99] public key/private key pair).
5With high probability (whp) is defined in our paper to be probability at least 1− ( 1
nc
+ negl(κ)
)
for all constants c.
6In some previous literature (e.g. [ACD+19]), this type of adaptive adversary is referred to as a weakly adaptive adversary.
7We generally assume that n is at least polynomial in κ: n = Ω(poly(κ)).
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For clarity we provide a simplified, informal definition of cryptographic sortition (which can be imple-
mented via VRFs) here; to see the full formal definition of VRFs [MVR99], please refer to Appendix C.1.
Cryptographic Sortition Cryptographic sortition ensures the following three properties:
1. Replica i using its secret key ski (and some public, common input) can determine whether they are
part of the voting committee and produce some output.
2. All other replicas can verify (but not produce with all but negligible probability in the security parameter
κ) replica i’s output using pki.
3. Lastly, the output is unique and is indistinguishable from random with high probability.
As in [ACD+19], we use the notation Fmine for replicas to use as an oracle for determining whether they
are eligible to vote in a committee. Fmine satisfies the properties of cryptographic sortition as stated above.
More specifically, Fmine is parameterized by replica i’s secret key ski, takes some input x, Fmine(ski, x),
and returns some output that is generated uniformly at random via some coin flip with appropriate prob-
ability. Furthermore, Fmine(ski, x) can provide some verification to other replicas that use only pki and
some additional information that is given as output from the function. We let the output value and proof
Fmine(ski, x) → (vi, pii) be vi and pii, respectively. One possible instantiation of Fmine is via verifiable
random functions. Please refer to Appendix C.1 for the full formal definition of VRFs.
In our paper, we also make use of an additional cryptographic primitive called verifiable delay functions
(VDFs) [BBBF18]. A VDF is a function that guarantees with all but negligible probability in κ that computing
the function takes some D sequential steps by some measure of difficulty D of the function. D number of
sequential steps is required even given polynomial number of parallel processors. We present the full formal
definition of VDFs in Appendix D. In this paper, we let VDFa be a VDF with difficulty Da. In our exposition,
we assume that the evaluation and verification keys are implied and passed into the function so we do not
expressively pass in these as parameters into the function. VDFa takes as input some x and outputs some
output S, VDFa(x)→ S, where S includes both the value of the output as well as the proof.
4.2 Other Notations and Definitions
We make abundant use of the Chernoff bound in our paper.
Definition 4.1 (Chernoff Bound). Let Y1, . . . , Ym be m independent random variables that take on values in
[0, 1] where E[Yi] = pi and
∑m
i=1 pi = P . For any γ ∈ (0, 1], the multiplicative Chernoff bound gives
P
[
m∑
i=1
Yi > (1 + γ)P
]
< exp
(−γ2P/3)
and
P
[
m∑
i=1
Yi < (1− γ)P
]
< exp
(−γ2P/2) .
We use the phrase “with high probability” many times throughout this paper. When we say “with high
probability”, we mean with high probability with respect to n and with overwhelming probability with respect
to κ; in other words, with probability at least 1− ( 1nc + negl(κ)) for all constants c. Throughout the paper,
we assume n = Θ(poly(κ)).
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5 Impossibility Results for BBA Using Sublinear Multicasts
In this section, we present two impossibility results regarding BBA protocols with adaptive adversaries: First,
we show that it is impossible to always achieve BBA in even the synchronous network using a sublinear
number of multicasts (this implies it is also impossible in the partially synchronous model). Then, we
show that it is impossible to achieve BBA with high probability in a partially synchronous network (in the
GST model) in o(n) multicasts. Both of these results are under our definition of BBA in a network where
honest replicas are only allowed to multicast messages. We consider the specific binary Byzantine agreement
problem that is defined in [ACD+19].8 We redefine the problem here for convenience:
Definition 5.1 (Binary Byzantine Agreement Problem (BBA)). Given a network with n replicas, each replica
i receives an input bit bi ∈ {0, 1}. The problem asks whether all replicas can reach an agreement that
satisfies the following properties with high probability:9
1. Termination: Every forever-honest replica i outputs a bit bi.
2. Consistency: If two forever-honest replicas output bi and bj , respectively, then bi = bj .
3. Validity: If all forever-honest replicas receive the same input bit b, then all forever-honest replicas
ouput b.
The proofs we present only apply to protocols where all honest replicas multicast messages, meaning
they, by their protocols, do not selectively choose to send messages to a specific replica but instead multicast
all messages to all replicas. The Byzantine replicas are not constrained in this way and can send any number
of point-to-point messages. Our impossibility results apply to protocols with this assumption. We define this
property as the honest total multicast property:
Definition 5.2 (Honest Total Multicast Protocols). Protocols where honest replicas multicast all messages
to all other replicas. Thus, the multicast complexity for such protocols equals the number of times honest
replicas multicast messages.
Lemma 5.3. Any correct honest total multicast protocol in the synchronous model with M multicast
complexity has at most M honest replicas which multicast before consensus is reached.
The proof of the aforementioned lemma immediately follows from the definition of honest total multicast
protocols.
Theorem 5.4. A honest total multicast protocol that uses sublinear o(n) multicasts with high probability
and always reaches BBA in the synchronous model cannot exist, even against a static adversary.
Proof. Supppose, for the sake of contradiction, that we have a correct honest total multicast BBA protocol
that achieves sublinear o(n) multicast complexity with high probability and always reaches agreement on
a bit. Then, suppose that during one iteration of the protocol on a set of n replicas, the protocol reaches
agreement wlog on the bit 1. Such an iteration must exist since the protocol must reach agreement on 1 if e.g.
all inputs to all replicas is 1. Let this iteration of the protocol be A. Since the protocol guarantees agreement
in sublinear multicast complexity with high probability, we can also assume A uses sublinear number of
multicasts (as such an iteration must exist). Thus, there exists some fraction of replicas which never multicast
any messages in A. Let this set of replicas be XA. Let the set of replicas that multicast at least one message
be YA. We know that |YA| = o(n) by Lemma 5.3. Let A reach agreement in RA synchronous rounds.
8This was also referred to in later works as multi-value agreement [CPS19].
9High probability is generally defined to be probability 1− 1
nc
for all constants c.
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Suppose we have another iteration of the protocol on the same set of n replicas, but where agreement is
reached on 0. Again, such an iteration must exist since all honest replicas must output 0 if e.g. all inputs to
honest replicas are 0. Let this iteration of the protocol be B. Let the set of replicas which never multicast any
messages be XB and the set of replicas that multicast at least one message be YB . As before, we know that
|YB| = o(n) by Lemma 5.3. Let B reach agreement in RB synchronous rounds.
Suppose the adversary picks bn/3c − 1 Byzantine replicas initially before the start of the protocol
uniformly at random. Let SA,B be a simulation of the protocol on the set of n replicas where all replicas
in YA ∪ YB are initially corrupted by the adversary. This is possible for large enough n since YA ∪ YB =
o(n). Furthermore, let half of the replicas in (XA ∪XB) \ (YA ∪ YB) have input 1 and have the same
internal state as the same replicas in iteration A. Let this half be H1. Let the other half of the replicas in
(XA ∪XB) \ (YA ∪ YB) have input 0 and have the same internal state as the same replicas in iteration B.
Let this half be H0. Such a simulation is a potential iteration of the protocol since before any messages are
sent the internal states of all replicas are determined solely by their inputs and their private random coin flips.
The adversary in simulation SA,B then sends two sets of messages by controlling the replicas in YA ∪ YB .
They send the same messages as in iteration A to all replicas in H1 and the same messages as in iteration B
to all replicas in H0. In this simulation, we assume all private coin flips for replicas in H1 correspond with
the same replicas in A and all private coin flips for replicas in H0 correspond with the same replicas in B.
Then, the replicas in H1 have no way to distinguish SA,B from A and will output 1. Similarly, the replicas in
H0 have no way to distinguish SA,B from B and will output 0.
Thus, we reach a contradiction as honest replicas H1 agreed on 1 and honest replicas H0 agreed on 0.
Thus, there does not exist a honest total multicast protocol that always reaches BBA in the synchronous
model, even against a static adversary, as there exists a potential simulation of the protocol that reaches
agreement on two different bits.
Our next impossibility result shows that there does not exist a partially synchronous BBA protocol (in
the GST model) with an adaptive adversary that achieves agreement in o(n) multicasts. We need to be
somewhat careful in our definition of multicast complexity in the partially synchronous model so that we
obtain a definition that is meaningful. What makes the partially synchronous model with adaptive adversaries
appealing is that it accurately simulates the real world: dropped messages can be simulated by an adversary
which doesn’t send messages (or selectively sends messages) to different replicas. We define the multicast
complexity to be the total number of multicasts necessary after the global stabilization time (GST) before
Byzantine agreement is reached. In contrast to the synchronous model, the asynchronous period starts at
the beginning of the protocol and continues for unknown, but bounded time. However, for the partially
synchronous model, we assume the synchronous period after one GST must be long enough for the protocol
to reach consensus.10
Our proof uses the lower bound proof given in Theorem 4 of [ACD+19].
Theorem 5.5. There does not exist a partially synchronous BBA protocol resilient against adaptive adver-
saries where all honest replicas reach agreement with high probability in o(n) multicasts given f Byzantine
replicas and for all n ≥ 3f + 1 number of replicas in the network.
Because the proof of Theorem 5.5 is very similar to the proof of Theorem 4 of [ACD+19], we relegate
this proof to Appendix A.
We show in Section 7 a BBA protocol that achieves agreement with high probability in a new, weaker
adverarial model than the partially synchronous (GST) model.
10In a system model where there can be multiple synchronous periods separated by asynchronous periods and thus multiple GSTs,
the synchronous period after a GST only needs to last long enough for one round of the protocol to complete.
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6 Consensus with Adaptive Adversaries using Sublinear Multicasts
We use the concepts expanded upon in the previous sections to formulate a communication-efficient consensus
protocol without the use of the memory-erasure model and which can be adapted to a variety of transaction
ordering schemes (e.g. for use in cryptocurrency applications). Namely, we make use of several important
concepts in formulating our protocol: verifiable delay functions (VDFs) [BBBF18], random leader/committee
elections, and the three-step commit rule of HotStuff [YMR+19]. The consensus protocol we describe in this
section operates in the synchronous model and can tolerate up to
(
1
3 − ε
)
n adaptive Byzantine corruptions.
First, we provide a brief description and a simplified version of our protocol in Section 6.1. Then, we
describe the full detailed version of our protocol in Section 6.2. In our protocol, safety and liveness hold with
high probability with respect to n and κ using n logO(1) n number of messages or logO(1) n multicasts. The
exact multicast complexity, round complexity and the proof of high probability by which this holds provided
in Theorem 6.1 is proven later in our analysis in Section 6.3. As we showed in our lower bound result
presented in Section 5, we cannot guarantee that safety always holds given a protocol that uses sublinear
multicasts even in the synchronous model and even given a static adversary. Thus, our protocol ensures the
best possible guarantees under the constraints we are operating under: both safety and liveness with high
probability with respect to n and κ.
Theorem 6.1. Assuming a valid VDF construction that satisfies Definition D.1, there exists a consensus
protocol that terminates in O(log n) rounds and reaches consensus using O(poly log n) multicasts with high
probability with respect to n and κ, even when assuming the adversary can perform VDF computations faster
by any constant factor c > 0.
6.1 Protocol Overview
In our protocol, we divide the communication rounds into epochs where each epoch goes through a leader
election as well as several rounds of communication to confirm a leader’s proposal. A leader is elected
after each honest replica i queries Fmine(ski, `) with its secret key and epoch number ` as input. Recall
from Section 4 that each replica i has oracle access to an oracle Fmine which will produce some output and
potentially a proof. The leader L,11 then computes a VDF output of the value L wants to propose. After
computing this VDF output, L sends the VDF output, the proposal, the output of Fmine(ski, `) and proofs to
all other replicas via a multicast.
After a proposal (with an attached VDF output and proof) is made by L, some number of replicas
are elected into committees to vote on the proposal. We use a total of three uniformly at random chosen
committees, similar to the three-step commit rule of HotStuff [YMR+19], to determine when a proposed
value is committed. However, unlike HotStuff, our committees are polylogarithmic in size with respect to the
number of participants in our consensus protocol. As in previous works which use player-replaceability (e.g.
[GHM+17]), each committee is chosen independently, likely with an entirely new set of participants.
To determine membership in a committee, each replica i passes into Fmine(ski, · · · ) as input the epoch
number ` and a label for the committee it is attempting to participate in. Each committee only votes for
proposals proposed in the current epoch; they will never vote for a proposal that was proposed in the previous
epoch or a future epoch. After a committee member has been chosen to participate in a committee, they
must compute a VDF on their intended vote; otherwise, honest replicas will not accept the vote without
a corresponding VDF output. When a replica multicasts its vote, it multicasts its vote along with its
Fmine(ski, · · · ) output, the VDF output, and all associated proofs.
To instantiate the VDFs we use in our protocol, we can use a number of recent VDF constructions
by [Wes19, Pie19, DGMV19] (some of which do not need trusted setup). They show constructions for VDFs
11With high probability in O(poly(log(n))) rounds , there will be one round where there is only one leader.
12
that, given a difficulty level D, can be computed in D + O(1) time and verified in O(log(D)) time given
a small number of processors. But such constructions also guarantee that even given polynomially many
parallel processors12, computing the output must take at least D − εD parallel time for small ε. The formal
definitions of such functions are given in the Preliminaries (Section 4).
Although, theoretically, most VDF constructions with the same difficulty must be computed within some
additive factor of one another, our protocol can in fact handle any VDF instantiations (in practice) where the
speed of computation of the VDFs differ by any constant multiplicative factor. This means that our protocol
is secure (w.h.p.) even when considering adversaries which may have faster VDF computing potential up to
any positive constant multiplicative factor.
We now formally describe our protocol below.
6.2 Detailed Protocol
Our detailed consensus protocol shown in Fig. 2 is run by every honest replica i. i maintains the private state
` which is the current epoch that i is on. Recall that we defined an epoch to be a period of time consisting of
many communication rounds in which voting for a particular proposal is done. In our protocol detailed below,
each epoch consists of R communication rounds; while the adversary can determine the order of messages
that arrive to replicas in our protocol, they cannot delay any message by more than ∆ delay.
Note that in contrast to other works which uses a VDF to compute an unpredictable source of randomness,
we simply use the VDF to enforce that the creation of a proposal or vote take some fixed amount of time. In
our protocol, leaders and committees are privately predictable— a replica can predict for which values of ` it
will be leader or on a committee. As in [ACD+19, CPS19], since we are operating in a permissioned system
(with n replicas), this does not affect the correctness of our protocol.
Figure 1 shows a simplified visual representation of our protocol.
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Pre-commit CommitVote
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broadcast
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Figure 1: A simplified visual representation of our protocol detailed in Figure 2. There are four total
communication rounds–the leader proposal round, the voting round, the pre-commit round, and the commit
round. In each round, the leader/committee members are chosen randomly via a call to Fmine(ski, · · · ).
6.3 Analysis
As before, we define the following terms, a round of a replica i consists of sending and/or receiving a set of
messages (in other words, one round of communication) and an epoch ` is defined to be one iteration of the
while loop defined in the protocol given in Fig. 2. Assuming ∆ message delay, we first prove that if there
12For an arbitrary polynomial.
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Protocol for replica i:
1. Let ` be the current epoch.
2. While a proposal has not been committed:
(a) Compute Fmine(ski, `)→ (vileader, piileader) where vileader is the output of the call to Fmine
and piileader is the associated proof.
(b) If vileader ≤ 12n , then:
i. Construct valid proposal P i` .
ii. Compute VDFm(`, vileader,P i`) → Mi which outputs Mi that contains a VDF output
value and a proof for the value.
iii. Once the output of VDFm has been computed, multicast (Mi, vileader, pi
i
leader,P i`).
iv. Set Si = P i` .
(c) Upon receiving a valid proposal (Mk, vkleader, pi
k
leader,Pk` ) and i is not a leader:
i. Compute Fmine(ski, `, ‘vote’)→ (vivote, piivote).
ii. Compute VDFv(`, vivote,Pk` )→ Vi.
iii. If vivote ≤ 2 log
2 n
3(1−ε)n (for some constant ε < 1/3 defined in the analysis), then multicast
(‘vote’, vivote, pi
i
vote, Vi,Pk` ).
iv. Set Si = Pk` .
(d) Upon receiving ≥ 2 log2 n3 valid ‘vote’ messages for proposal Si:
i. Compute Fmine(ski, `, ‘precommit’)→ (viprecommit, piiprecommit).
ii. Compute VDFp(`, viprecommit, Si)→ Pi.
iii. If viprecommit ≤ 2 log
2 n
3(1−ε)n , then multicast
(‘precommit’, viprecommit, pi
i
precommit, Pi, Si).
iv. Set S′i = Si.
(e) Upon receiving ≥ 2 log2 n3 valid ‘precommit’ messages for proposal S′i:
i. Compute Fmine(ski, `, ‘commit’)→ (vicommit, piicommit).
ii. Compute VDFc(`, vicommit, S
′
i)→ Ci.
iii. If vicommit ≤ 2 log
2 n
3(1−ε)n , then multicast (‘commit’, v
i
commit, pi
i
commit, Ci, S
′
i).
iv. Set S′′i = S
′
i.
(f) Upon receiving ≥ 2 log2 n3 valid ‘commit’ messages for proposal S′′i , commit to S′′i and set
Si, S
′
i, S
′′
i = ∅.
(g) Timeout if none of the above steps can be taken after ∆ time.
3. After R communication rounds (for R defined in the analysis to be X/∆) and/or timeouts,
terminate the while loop for epoch `, set Si, S′i, S
′′
i = ∅ and proceed with epoch ` + 1 of the
protocol.
Figure 2: General consensus protocol for honest replica i.
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is exactly one leader–which is honest, there are ≥ 2 log2 n3 honest replicas in each committee, and there are
< log
2 n
3 Byzantine replicas in each committee, then we can reach consensus on the leader’s proposal given
appropriate initial settings of the parameters.
Let δ′h, δh and δadv be constants δ
′
h, δh, δadv > 0. We assume that the slowest honest replica takes δ
′
hD
time to compute a VDF of difficulty D, the fastest honest replica takes δhD time to compute the VDF, and
any Byzantine replica takes δadvD time to compute the VDF. We show that our protocol accounts for the
most interesting settings of the parameters: δ′h, δh > δadv; in the case when the adversary computes the VDF
slower than honest replicas, security can be proven trivially. Let X be the total time (in terms of ∆) that each
epoch consists of and R = X/∆ is the corresponding number of communication rounds.13 We give the exact
bounds for these variables, X and R, in our proofs (in terms of ∆). Throughout our proofs, we let Dx be the
difficulty level of VDFx.
Lemma 6.2. Let ∆ be the message delay. For epoch `, suppose that there is exactly one leader, which is
honest, there are ≥ 2 log2 n3 honest replicas in each committee, and there are < log
2 n
3 Byzantine replicas in
each committee. When δ′h, δh > δadv > 0 and δh ≈ δ′h, there exist values Dm, Dc, Dp, Dv, X > ∆ in terms
of δh, δ′h, δadv, and ∆ that allow for the leader’s proposal to be committed by all honest replicas with high
probability with respect to n and κ.
Proof. In the case where there is exactly one leader, who is honest, and all committees have ≥ 2 log2 n3
honest replicas and < log
2 n
3 Byzantine replicas, each leader and honest committee member will send out
exactly one proposal/vote. However, the adversary can potentially choose to adaptively corrupt the leader
and/or committee members and send out multiple proposals if the difficulty levels of our VDFs are not
set appropriately. The only way that an adversary can send multiple proposals or votes is if they compute
the VDFs associated with the proposals or votes. Since we assume that the adversary cannot guess the
private keys of the honest replicas with all but negligible probability in κ, they cannot compute the VDFs
of the extra proposals and votes until after they corrupt the replicas with all but negligible probability in κ
by Definition D.1. By the assumptions given in the lemma statement, initially both the leader and majority of
committee members are so-far honest. Thus, we need only concern ourselves with the cases when the honest
replicas are corrupted after they announce their leadership/committee status.
In order to prevent the leader from sending multiple proposals, the leader must not have enough time to
compute a new VDF output on a new proposal after computing the current VDF output on the proposal they
have already multicasted. Recall that by our definitions of δh and δadv, the fastest that an honest replica can
compute VDFm is δhDm and any Byzantine replica must take at least δadvDm time to compute VDFm.
We must ensure that each time a replica computes a VDF and sends the result, the adversary does not
have enough time to compute another value for the VDF before we proceed with the next epoch. Thus, the
difficulty levels of the VDFs must be set accordingly. Let X be the time that an epoch lasts (in terms of ∆)
before we proceed to the next epoch. Then, for example, for the leader proposal round, the amount of time it
takes for the fastest honest replica to compute the corresponding proposal VDF plus the time it takes for the
adversary to take control of the honest proposer and compute another VDF must be longer than the length
of the epoch. The constraint on the difficulty level Dm must then follow: (δh + δadv)Dm > X . Following
this pattern, the remaining difficulty terms must follow similar constraints. Intuitively, this also means that
Dm > Dv > Dp > Dc. Finally, X must be long enough so that honest replicas can compute, receive, and
verify all VDF outputs so they can commit a proposal if the conditions of the lemma are followed.
From the intuition above, the difficulty levels that are set must specifically follow the following constraints:
13In the case when X is not divisible by ∆, we can increase the duration of X such that it becomes divisible by R.
15
(δh + δadv)Dm > X (1)
δh(Dm +Dv) + δadvDv > X (2)
δh(Dm +Dv +Dp) + δadvDp > X (3)
δh(Dm +Dv +Dp +Dc) + δadvDc > X (4)
X ≥ δ′h(Dm + log(Dm) +Dv + log(Dv) +Dp + log(Dp) +Dc + log(Dc)) + 4∆ (5)
We solve this set of equations to obtain the following set of expressions for Dm, Dv, Dp, and Dc in terms
of X:
Dm >
X
δh + δadv
(6)
Dv >
X
δh + δadv
− δh
(
X
(δh + δadv)
2
)
(7)
Dp >
X
δh + δadv
− 2δh
(
X
(δh + δadv)
2
)
+ δ2h
(
X
(δh + δadv)
3
)
(8)
Dt >
X
δh + δadv
− 3δh
(
X
(δh + δadv)
2
)
+ 3δ2h
(
X
(δh + δadv)
3
)
− δ3h
(
X
(δh + δadv)
4
)
(9)
Substituting the above into Eq. 5 gives us a lower bound for X from which we can also derive the other
values. First we replace log(D) with ε′D for some small constant ε′ for all D.
X > δ′h
(
(1 + ε′)Dm + (1 + ε′)Dv + (1 + ε′)Dp + (1 + ε′)Dc
)
+ 4∆
(10)
X > δ′h(1 + ε
′)
((
4X
δh + δadv
)
− 6δh
(
X
(δh + δadv)
2
)
+ 4δ2h
(
X
(δh + δadv)
3
)
− δ3h
(
X
(δh + δadv)
4
))
+ 4∆
(11)
X >
4∆
1− δ′h(1 + ε′)
(
4
δh+δadv
− 6δh
(δh+δadv)
2 +
4δ2h
(δh+δadv)
3 − δ
3
h
(δh+δadv)
4
) .
(12)
Substituting the expression for X will lead to values of Dm, Dv, Dp and Dc in terms of the values of δh,
δ′h, and δadv.
This expression is valid iff
1− δ′h(1 + ε′)
(
4
δh + δadv
− 6δh
(δh + δadv)
2 +
4δ2h
(δh + δadv)
3 −
δ3h
(δh + δadv)
4
)
> 0 (13)
δ′h <
1
(1 + ε′)
(
4
δh+δadv
− 6δh
(δh+δadv)
2 +
4δ2h
(δh+δadv)
3 − δ
3
h
(δh+δadv)
4
) (14)
and
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4δh + δadv
− 6δh
(δh + δadv)
2 +
4δ2h
(δh + δadv)
3 −
δ3h
(δh + δadv)
4 > 0. (15)
Eq. 15 is always true for all δh > 0, δadv > 0. Hence, we need only concern ourselves with the constraint
defined by Eq. 14. Assuming that ε′ is negligible14, we can simplify to obtain:
δ′h <
(δh + δadv)
4
δ3h + 4δ
2
hδadv + 6δhδ
2
adv + 4δ
3
adv
. (16)
For all values of δh, δadv, we obtain a bound for δ′h where there exist values we can set δ
′
h such that
δ′h > δh. We have thus proven that there exist values of Dm, Dc, Dp, Dv, X > ∆ given δ
′
h, δh > δadv > 0
and δh ≈ δ′h that we can set to prevent violation of safety by the corruption of so-far honest replicas.
In such cases, when the conditions given in the statement of the lemma are followed, given exactly one
honest proposer and committees dominated by honest replicas, the adversary is not able to produce additional
proposals or votes with all but negligible probability in κ. Furthermore, the adversary does not have enough
time to corrupt an honest replica and compute the associated message or vote VDF before the epoch has
progressed to the next epoch.
Since a single honest leader will always propose exactly one proposal, all honest replicas will vote for the
same proposal, reaching the necessary number of votes. Hence, the leader’s proposal will be committed by
all honest replicas.
Now, we remove the constraint of δ′h ≈ δh by assuming that each honest replica with a faster VDF
implementation than δ′h can choose to delay sending their proposal or vote until after the time that it would
have taken the replicas that take δ′hD time to compute and verify the VDFs. This immediately allows us to
conclude that our protocol can handle any constant values of δadv, δh > 0 (since the constraint δh ≈ δ′h in
Lemma 6.2 is trivially satisfied). For Corollary 6.3, we assume that all honest replicas compute the VDFs
with speed δh.
Corollary 6.3. Let ∆ be the message delay. For epoch `, suppose that there is exactly one leader, which is
honest, there are ≥ 2 log2 n3 honest replicas in each committee, and there are < log
2 n
3 Byzantine replicas in
each committee. When δh > δadv > 0, there exist values Dm, Dc, Dp, Dv, X > ∆ in terms of δh, δadv and
∆ that allow for the leader’s proposal to be committed by all honest replicas.
In the rest of this section, we prove the safety and liveness of our consensus protocol which directly leads
to the proof of Theorem 6.1.
We first show that each epoch consists of a constant number of rounds.
Lemma 6.4. Each epoch consists of O(1) communication rounds.
Proof. By Lemma 6.2 and Corollary 6.3, the duration of the epoch, X , is in terms of δh, δ′h, δadv and ∆.
Since a communication round lasts at most ∆ time and δh, δ′h, and δadv are constants, an epoch consists of
O(1) communication rounds.
We now show that, with high probability, the conditions stated in Lemma 6.2 and Corollary 6.3 can be
satisfied. To do this, we first show that with high probability, after O(log n) epochs, there will exist an epoch
which has exactly one so-far honest leader.
14Given that we pick ε′ such that ε′D ≥ log(D), if ε′ is not negligible, then we can increase the delay 4∆ in Eq. 5 to something
greater to account for the time necessary to verify the VDF computations.
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Lemma 6.5. After O (log n) epochs, there will be at least one epoch in which there exists exactly one leader
and that leader is honest.
Proof. At the beginning of epoch `, at most f replicas are Byzantine when the leader is chosen. Therefore,
the probability that an already-Byzantine node is chosen is f2n <
n/3
2n =
1
6 . Thus, the probability that a
Byzantine node is chosen to be a leader for every epoch after c log n epochs is
(
1
6
)c logn
= Θ
(
1
nc
)
. Thus,
with high probability, after c log n epochs, there will exist at least one epoch where no Byzantine replicas are
elected as leaders. By the Chernoff bound, the probability that more than one leader is elected in every epoch
after c log n epochs is ≤ exp(−1/6)c logn = Θ ( 1nc ). The probability that no leaders are elected after c log n
rounds is < (1− exp(−1/6))c logn = Θ ( 1nc ). By the union bound, the probability that any of the above
three bad cases occur after c log n rounds is bounded by Θ
(
1
nc
)
for all c > 0. Thus, with high probability,
there exists at least one round in which there exists exactly one leader and that leader is honest.
Lemma 6.6. Suppose that the number of Byzantine replicas, f is given by f < εfn for some constant
εf < ε provided ε < 1/3 (in Fig. 2). Then, there exist an arbitrarily small constant 0 < ε′ < 1 such
that after O (1) epochs, there will be at least one round where all committees have ≥ 2 log2 n3 honest
replicas in each committee, and there are < log
2 n
3 Byzantine replicas in each committee with probability
1−O (exp (−ε′2(1− εf ) log2 n/9(1− ε))) for some constants 0 < ε′ < 1, 0 < ε < 1/3, and 0 < εf < ε.
Proof. The expected number of honest replicas that will be chosen for any committee is given by (n −
f)
(
2 log2 n
3(1−ε)n
)
=
2(1−εf ) log2 n
3(1−ε) >
2 log2 n
3 since εf < ε. By the Chernoff bound, the probability that less than
(1−ε1)
(
2(1−εf ) log2 n
3(1−ε)
)
honest replicas are chosen into the committee is< exp
(−ε21(1− εf ) log2 n/3(1− ε)).
In order for the number of honest replicas to be ≥ 2 log2 n3 , we must have (1− ε1)
(
2(1−εf ) log2 n
3(1−ε)
)
≥ 2 log2 n3 .
Thus, we obtain ε1 ≤ 1− 1−ε1−εf . Since εf < ε, there always exist values of ε < 1/3 and 0 < ε1 < 1 such
that the condition is satisfied. The probability that after O (1) epochs there exists an epoch with ≥ 2 log2 n3
honest replicas in each committee is then given by 1−O (exp (−ε21(1− εf ) log2 n/3(1− ε))).
The expected number of Byzantine replicas that will be chosen for any committee is given by f
(
2 log2 n
3(1−ε)n
)
≤
εfn
(
2 log2 n
3(1−ε)n
)
=
2εf log
2 n
3(1−ε) . By the Chernoff bound, the probability that > (1 + ε2)
(
2εf log
2 n
3(1−ε)
)
replicas in
the committee are Byzantine replicas is given by < exp(−2ε22εf log2 n/9(1− ε)). In order for the number
of Byzantine replicas to be < 2 log
2 n
3 , we must have (1 + ε2)
(
2εf log
2 n
3(1−ε)
)
< log
2 n
3 . Solving, we obtain
ε2 <
1−ε
2εf
− 1. Since εf < ε and ε < 1/3, there always exists a value 0 < ε2 < 1 that satisfies this inequality.
The probability that after O (1) epochs there exists an epoch where < log
2 n
3 Byzantine replicas are in each
committee is then given by 1−O (exp(−2ε22εf log2 n/9(1− ε))).
The probability that both conditions are satisfied is
1−O (exp (−ε21(1− εf ) log2 n/3(1− ε))+ exp(−2ε22εf log2 n/9(1− ε))) .
Thus, there exist constants 0 < ε′ < 1, εf < ε, and ε < 1/3 where the probability that both conditions are
satisfied is 1−O (exp (−ε′2(1− εf ) log2 n/9(1− ε))).
Corollary 6.7. Suppose that the number of Byzantine replicas, f , is given by f < εfn for some constant
εf < ε provided ε < 1/3 (in Fig. 2). With high probability, afterO(1) epochs, there will be at least one epoch
where all committees have ≥ 2 log2 n3 honest replicas in each committee, and there are < log
2 n
3 Byzantine
replicas in each committee.
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Proof. By Lemma 6.6, the probability that the conditions of this corollary are satisfied given constants ε, εf ,
and ε′ is 1−O (exp (−ε′2(1− εf ) log2 n/9(1− ε))). Since ε, ε′, and εf are constants, the probability that
the conditions of this corollary are satisfied is 1− o ( 1nc ) for any constant c ≥ 1.
Lemma 6.8. After O(logc n) epochs, for any constant c ≥ 1, the probability that the result of the selection
of replicas for committees gives 2(1 + εm)εf
(
2 log2 n
3(1−ε)
)
+ (1 + εm)(1− εf )
(
2 log2 n
3(1−ε)
)
< 4 log
2 n
3 votes for
all committees of an epoch is 1−O
(
logc n exp
(
−2ε2m(1−εf ) log2 n9(1−ε)
))
for constants 0 < εm < 1, 0 < εf <
ε, 0 < ε < 1/3.
Proof. Suppose there exists at least two proposals made by leaders. By the Chernoff bound, the probability
that Byzantine replicas cast> 2(1+εm)εf
(
2 log2 n
3(1−ε)
)
votes is bounded by exp(−4ε2mεf log2 n/9(1−ε)), and
the probability that honest replicas cast > (1 + εm)(1− εf )
(
2 log2 n
3(1−ε)
)
votes is bounded by exp(−2ε2m(1−
εf ) log
2 n/9(1− ε)). By the union bound, the probability that both types of votes are upper bounded is then
1− O
(
logc n exp
(
−2ε2m(1−εf ) log2 n9(1−ε)
))
. What remains to be shown is that there exist constants such that
2(1 + εm)εf
(
2 log2 n
3(1−ε)
)
+ (1 + εm)(1 − εf )
(
2 log2 n
3(1−ε)
)
< 4 log
2 n
3 . Since εf < ε and ε < 1/3, we solve for
εm from the expressions to obtain εm <
2(1−ε)
1+εf
− 1. Since εf < ε < 1/3, 2(1−ε)1+εf > 1. Thus, there exist
constants 0 < εm < 1, εf < ε, ε < 1/3 such that the inequality is satisfied.
Corollary 6.9. With high probability, afterO(logc n) epochs for any c > 0, no epoch has all three committees
have ≥ 4 log2 n3 votes.
Proof. Lemma 6.8 shows that≥ 4 log2 n3 votes occur withO
(
logc n exp
(
−2ε2m(1−εf ) log2 n9(1−ε)
))
probability for
constants εm, εf , ε which means that with probability 1− o
(
1
nc
)
for all constants c, this does not occur.
Using our lemmas above, we now prove the safety and liveness of our consensus protocol.
Lemma 6.10. Our protocol maintains safety with high probability.
Proof. By Corollary 6.9, with high probability, after O(logc n) rounds, no round has all three committees
have ≥ 4 log2 n3 votes. We prove that this means that no two different proposals will be committed by different
honest replicas. During the round in which there are < log
2 n
3 Byzantine replicas and ≤ 2 log
2 n
3 honest
replicas, it is impossible to reach the threshold of ≥ 2 log2 n3 votes on two different proposals even if all
Byzantine replicas double vote. Furthermore, no honest replica will ever vote for two different proposals in
the same round. Without the necessary votes, no two different proposals will be committed by two different
honest replicas. Thus, safety is maintained with high probability.
Lemma 6.11. Our protocol reaches consensus in O(log n) epochs with high probability.
Proof. By Lemma 6.5 and Corollary 6.7, there will be at least one round after O(log n) rounds where the
conditions of Corollary 6.3 will be satisfied. Therefore, after O(log n) rounds, with high probability, our
protocol reaches consensus.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. The safety and liveness of our protocol are proven by Lemmas 6.10 and 6.11. Fur-
thermore by Lemma 6.4, each epoch consists of O(1) rounds; thus, our protocol terminates in O(log n)
rounds with high probability. Since committees have size O(log2 n), our protocol uses at most O
(
log3 n
)
multicasts.
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7 Sublinear Clock Synchronization with Adaptive Adversaries and Ran-
domly Dropped Messages
Given the previous impossibility result in Section 5, we cannot hope to achieve BBA with sublinear multicasts
with high probability in the partially sychronous (GST) network model as defined in [DLS88] with adaptive
adversaries. Instead, we use a slightly different network model. We define this model as the partially
synchronous with randomly dropped messages model. This model may have practical applications as a model
that represents an unreliable/faulty network.
Definition 7.1 (Partially Synchronous with Randomly Dropped Messages Model). For the asynchronous
phase of the partially synchronous with randomly dropped messages model, the adversary can only choose to
perform the following actions on the network:
1. drop messages with some constant probability 0 ≤ p < 1 (i.e. each individual message has a probability
p of being dropped),
2. delay messages by delay at most ∆, and
3. delay processors by delay at most Φ.
All other characteristics of the model follow that of the partially synchronous (GST) model.
In this network model, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 7.2. There exists a communication-efficient BBA protocol in the partially synchronous with ran-
domly dropped messages model that reaches agreement with high probability with respect to n and κ.
Our protocol is based on an adaptation, provided in Appendix B, of the linear-multicast protocol given
in [ACD+19] for the partially synchronous model. Specifically, we formulate a novel clock synchronization
procedure for both the partially synchronous model (using linear multicasts) and the partially synchronous
with randomly dropped messages model (using sublinear multicasts). This clock synchronization procedure
uses the three-step commit rule of HotStuff [YMR+19] and may be of independent interest for use in other
protocols. The details on our linear multicast protocol in the partially synchronous (GST) model can be found
in Appendix B and details on our sublinear multicast protocol in the partially synchronous with randomly
dropped messages model can be found in Section 7.
We first assume in our protocols that knowledge of p is given at the time of formulation of the protocol
(i.e. p can be assumed to be a known constant in our protocols).
Keeping such challenges described in Appendix B in mind, we first provide our revised round synchro-
nization protocol below.
7.1 Sublinear Clock Synchronization Protocol Analysis
We now analyze our sublinear round protocol (which is also an honest total multicast protocol) that syn-
chronizes to a round that is not advantageous for the adversary, keeping in mind the challenges described in
Appendix B.
We first show that an adversarially dominated committee is unlikely. Suppose that the asynchronous part
of the protocol lasts at most T = O
(
3log
c n
)
rounds, then using this, we can prove the following lemma:
Lemma 7.3. Suppose D0 = 2 log
d n
3(1−ε)n (where d > c) for some ε < 1/3 and the number of Byzantine replicas,
f , in the network is f < ε′n where ε′ < ε, the probability that a round where the adversary controls at least
(1+ε′′) logc n
3 for ε
′′ < 1 replicas in the committee exists within T = O
(
3log
c n
)
rounds is O
(
1
nd−1
)
.
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Protocol for replica i:
1. Replica i, set Ci = 0.
2. While protocol not terminated, for an honest replica i:
(a) Decide whether part of the round proposal committee, i.e. check if Fmine(ski, Ci) < D0.
(b) Multicast Ci + 1, certificate for Ci (when Ci = 0, no certificate is needed),
and proof of committee membership each repeatedly 1/p times.
(c) Wait ∆ + Φ time or after receiving > 3λ round proposals. Record all valid rounds seen (i.e.
rounds R with a valid certificate for R − 1). If i sees a certificate for a round j > Ci, i
updates its Ci ← j. If the number of rounds seen is > 3λ, determine the smallest round R
greater than Ci, is smaller than T = O
(
3log
c n
)
, and with a valid certificate for R− 1; let
this round be S.
(d) If Fmine(ski, ‘tentative’, S) < D0, then i is a member of the
tentative round voting comittee: then multicast a vote for S repeatedly 11−p times.
(e) Count votes. If any round receives 2λ+ 1 votes for S, set tentative round to this round. Set
Ti to be the new tentative round.
(f) If Fmine(ski, ‘pre-confirmed’, Ti) < D0, then i is a member of the
pre-confirmed round voting comittee: then multicast a vote for Ti repeatedly 11−p times.
(g) Count votes. If Ti receives 2λ+ 1 votes, set pre-confirmed round to this round. Set Ci to be
the new pre-confirmed round.
(h) If Fmine(ski, ‘confirmed’, Ci) < D0, then i member of confirmed round voting committee:
then multicast vote for pre-confirmed round Ci repeatedly 1/p times.
(i) Upon receiving 2λ+ 1 votes for pre-confirmed round Ci, set confirmed round to this round.
Perform the rest of the protocol only if confirmed round is set.
(j) Timeout and restart with Ci + 1 again if any of the above steps take longer than 2∆ + 2Φ
time or if any of S, Ti, or Ci does not receive enough votes.
Figure 3: Sublinear Multicast Clock Synchronization in Partially Synchronous with Randomly Dropped
Messages Model. Underlined portions of the protocol are instructions unique to the partially synchronous
with randomly dropped messages model.
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Proof. The probability that any one replica joins the committee is 2 log
d n
3(1−ε)n . Given f < ε
′n Byzantine replicas
where ε′ < ε, the expected number of Byzantine replicas in any committee is 2ε
′ logd n
3(1−ε) . Thus, by the Chernoff
bound, the probability that any committee has more than (1 + ε′′)2ε
′ logd n
3(1−ε) < (1 + ε
′′) log
d n
3 replicas is
given by < exp(−ε′′2 logd n/9). Thus, the probability that at least (1+ε′′) logc n3 Byzantine replicas are in any
committee after T rounds is upper bounded by O
(
Te
− ε′′22ε′ logd n
9(1−ε)
)
= O
(
3log
c n
e
− ε′′22ε′ logd n
9(1−ε)
)
= o
(
1
na
)
for all
constant a.
Now we bound the probability that during the asynchronous period less than (1 − ε′′)2 logd n3 honest
replicas receive the lowest valid round that is multicasted.
Lemma 7.4. Suppose D0 = 2 log
d n
3(1−ε)n for some ε < 1/3 and the number of Byzantine replicas, f , in the
network is f < ε′n where ε′ < ε, the probability that less than (1− ε′′)2 logd n3 honest replicas in a committee
receive the minimum round that is multicasted is O
(
1
nc
)
for any c > 1.
Proof. The probability that any message is dropped is p. But each honest replica multicasts each message
1/p times. Thus, the expected number of honest replicas in a committee that receive the minimum round
that is multicasted is 2(1−ε
′) logd n
3(1−ε) . Since ε
′ < ε < 1/3, this value is lower bounded by 2 log
d n
3 . Hence, by
the Chernoff bound, the probability that less than (1− ε′′)2 logd n3 honest replicas do not receive the smallest
valid round multicasted is O
(
1
nc
)
for c > 1 for any constant ε′′ > 0 used in the Chernoff bound.
Using the above we can now prove the safety of our round synchronization protocol during the asyn-
chronous period of our network.
Lemma 7.5. Given committees of size O(logd n) and T = Θ
(
3log
c n
)
, an honest replica never confirms an
epoch smaller than an epoch already confirmed by another honest replica with high probability.
Proof. In order for an honest replica to confirm an epoch smaller than the largest confirmed epoch by any
honest replica, a sequence of events must occur. First, the replica must not have received the votes confirming
the previous larger epoch. Second, it must not have seen the previous epoch proposed by the proposal
committee. Finally, a large enough portion of the committee must not have seen the certificate multicasted
for epochs greater than the smaller epoch in order to confirm the new smaller epoch (as well as the previous
multicasts). Given a set of logd n committee members, the probability that all of the above occurs is upper
bounded by the probability that enough honest replicas do not see the smallest epoch multicasted and the
adversary controls a large enough fraction of the committees. The probability that both occur by the union
bound on Lemmas 7.3 and 7.4 is O
(
1
nc
)
for any c > 1. Thus, with high probability when the asynchronous
period lasts for T = O
(
3log
c n
)
rounds, safety is preserved.
The remaining proofs for round synchronization follow closely that of the warmup protocol in Ap-
pendix B.3.
7.2 Sublinear BBA in the Partially Synchronous with Randomly Dropped Messages Model
Below, we use our sublinear multicast clock synchronization protocol to obtain a sublinear multicast BBA
protocol in the partially synchronous with randomly dropped messages model. Because our protocol is
very similar to our linear multicast protocol presented in Appendix B, we only underline the portions of the
protocol that differ in this case.
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Protocol for replica i:
1. Set Ti = 1 and Fi = 1 at the start of the protocol before receiving any messages from round
leaders (and before sending ACKs). Initialize b∗i to the bit received initially as input before the
protocol starts.
2. The following is performed repeatedly until replica i commits to a bit (outputs a bit):
(a) Run the round synchronization process detailed in Figure 3. Only proceed with the rest of
the protocol after becoming synchronized to a round. Let S be this confirmed round.
(b) Flip a random (fair) coin to determine a bit, b. Then, check if Fmine(ski, Propose, S, b) <
D0 for some value D0 to be determined later in our analysis.
(c) If Fmine(ski, Propose, S, b) < D0, multicast (Propose, S, b) and a proof.
(d) After receiving a valid propose (Propose, S, b′) message (and proof piS):
i. Wait δ time (for some δ to be defined in the analysis) to see if it receives another
unconfirmed proposal (Propose, S, b′′) where b′ 6= b′′. If i receives such a proposal,
then i does nothing this round.
ii. Otherwise, set b∗i := b
′ if Fi = 0
iii. If Fmine(ski,Multicast, S, b∗i ) < D1, multicast (ACK, S, b∗i ).
(e) If received ≥ b2 logd n/3c ACKs (ACK, S, b′) (from different replicas) where b∗i = b′, set
Fi := 1.
(f) If received≥ b2 logd n/3c ACKs (ACK, S, b′) (from different replicas) where > f of the ACKs
are for b∗i 6= b′, set Fi := 0.
(g) If after δ delay, i eventually received at least b2 logd n/3c ACKs (ACK, S, b), then increment
Ti
T←−i +1.
(h) At the end of K rounds, i.e. when Ti = K (for some K to be determined later in our
analysis), if Fi = 1, commit to b∗i and return b
∗
i as output bit.
(i) After completing the above protocol, start the round synchronization process again.
(j) If after waiting 5δ time, no further step can be taken during any point of the above protocol,
start with the next iteration at the beginning of this loop.
Figure 4: Polylogarithmic multicast simple round synchronization protocol.
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7.3 Analysis
We first prove the following lemma regarding our protocol which will help us obtain our final result on the
communication complexity and number of rounds (after GST) our protocol requires.
Lemma 7.6. Let D1 = 2 log
d n
3(1−ε)n , after O(poly log n) rounds after GST, the probability that all epochs have
at least one committee which has < b2 logd n3 c honest replicas is O
(
1
nc
)
for all c > 1.
Proof. The expected number of honest replicas in each committee is at least 2(1−ε
′) logd n
3(1−ε)n since we expect
the number of honest replicas to be ≥ (1 − ε′)n. Since, by definition, ε′ < ε, the expected number of
honest replicas in each committee is then at least 2c log
d n
3 where c =
1−ε′
1−ε . Then, by the Chernoff bound, the
probability that less than (1− εc)
(
2c logd n
3
)
honest replicas are in any committee is < exp
(
−2ε2cc logd n3
)
.
When (1− εc)
(
1−ε′
1−ε
)
≥ 1, (1− εc)
(
2c logd n
3
)
≥ 2 logd n3 . There exists such a constant 0 < εc < 1 where
this constraint is satisfied since ε′ < ε (i.e. when εc ≤ 1 − 1−ε1−ε′ ) The probability that any of the three
committees in an epoch have less than 2 log
d n
3 honest replicas in the committee is, by the union bound,
3 exp
(
−2ε2cc logd n3
)
. Hence, after O(poly log n) rounds, the probability that all epochs have at least one
committee which has < b2 logd n3 c honest replicas is upper bounded by O
(
1
nc
)
for all c > 1.
Next, we prove that with high probability Byzantine replicas cannot vote for both 0 and 1 in all three
committees for any epoch after O(logd n) epochs.
Lemma 7.7. After GST, given D1 = 2 log
d n
3(1−ε)n , after O(log
d n) epochs, with high probability, Byzantine
replicas cannot vote for both 0 and 1 in all three committees (such that the votes reach the threshold for both
bits) for any of the O(logd n) epochs.
Proof. The expected number of votes mined by Byzantine replicas is upper bounded by the expected number
of votes mined by all replicas, which is at most 2 log
d n
3(1−ε) . In order to vote for both 0 and 1 and successfully
reach the threshold, Byzantine replicas and honest replicas together need to mine at least 4 log
d n
3 votes. Since
we defined ε < 1/3, the expected number of votes is < 4 log
d n
3 (where we assume that Byzantine replicas
attempt to vote twice). Then, by the Chernoff bound, the probability that any committee has ≥ 4 logd n3 votes
is at least exp
(
−
(
4
3(1+ε′)−1
)2
logd n
3
)
. Thus, with high probability after O(logd n) rounds, no epoch has all
three committees have enough votes such that Byzantine replicas can vote for both 0 and 1 and reach the
threshold.
Now, we can compute the probability that a single, honest leader is elected after O(log n) rounds.
Lemma 7.8. After GST, given D0 = 112n and where ε < 1/3, after O(log n) epochs, with high probability, a
single honest leader is elected.
Proof. With probability ≤ 1 − 1−ε′12 , no honest leaders are elected in round i. The probability that more
than a single leader is elected in round i is given (by the Chernoff bound) to be < exp(−121/36). Thus,
the probability that round i either has no honest leaders or more than one leader is, by the union bound,
1 − 1−ε′12 + exp(−121/36) < 1. Thus, after O(log n) rounds, a single honest leader is elected with high
probability.
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Now we prove that, with high probability, honest nodes cannot commit to two different bits during the
asynchronous period. Furthermore, we prove that with high probability, if all honest nodes start with the
same bit, no honest node will commit to the other bit.
Lemma 7.9. No two honest replicas will commit two different bits during the asynchronous period.
Proof. In order for a honest replica to commit to a bit, it must receive a proposal and committee votes
from three committees. The expected number of honest replicas that receive the proposal and all (honest)
committee votes is (1− ε′)n. Thus, by the Chernoff bound, the probability that < (1− εc)(1− ε′)n honest
replicas receive all proposals and vote messages is < exp
(
− ε2c(1−ε′)n2
)
≤ exp
(
− ε2cn3
)
. The expected
number of votes that come from the honest replicas that do not receive all messages and Byzantine replicas
(assuming all Byzantine replicas attempt to vote twice) is < 4ε
′ logd n
3(1−ε) +
2εc log
d n
3(1−ε) . Let S be the expected
number of such votes. By setting εc < 1− ε− 2ε′, the expected number of such votes is S < 2 log
d n
3 . By
the Chernoff bound, the probability that more than (1 + ε1)S votes are from Byzantine replicas or honest
replicas that do not receive all messages is < exp
(
−2ε21 logd n3
)
. Hence, assuming T = Θ
(
3log
c n
)
, with
high probability, no honest replica will commit the other bit during the asynchronous period.
Corollary 7.10. If all honest replicas start with the same bit as their input, then, with high probability, no
honest replica will commit to the other bit during the asynchronous (with randomly dropped messages)
period.
Using the above lemmas, we prove our final result.
Theorem 7.11. Let D0 = 112n , D1 =
2 logd n
3(1−ε)n and assuming T = O
(
3log
c n
)
, after GST, after O(poly log n)
rounds, agreement is reached with high probability using O(logd n) multicasts where d > c.
Proof. By Lemma 7.9 and Corollary 7.10, no two honest replicas will commit to different bits during the
asynchronous period with high probability. Thus, we are concerned with only reaching agreement after
GST. By Lemma 7.3, with high probability, no committee after GST is dominated by Byzantine replicas.
Furthermore, Lemma 7.5 shows that no replica confirms an epoch smaller than an epoch already confirmed,
hence, progress is made after GST. By Lemma 7.6, with high probability after GST, there exists an epoch
after O (poly log n) rounds where all committees have sufficiently many honest replicas. Furthermore,
by Lemma 7.7, after GST, there does not exist an epoch where Byzantine replicas can successfully vote for
both bits before agreement is reached with high probability. Finally, by Lemma 7.8, within O (poly log n)
rounds after GST, a single honest leader is elected with high probability. Thus, within O (poly log n) rounds,
O(log n) honest leaders are elected with high probability. The remaining parts of the proof directly follow
that provided in Appendix B.2. Hence, we prove our lemma statement.
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A Deferred Proofs from Section 5
Proof of Theorem 5.5. By definition of a partially synchronous network and an adaptive adversary, the
adversary has the power to selectively delete messages during the asynchronous phase. Thus, we simulate
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the strategy presented in Theorem 4 of [ACD+19] during the asynchronous phase to prove our lower bound.
Because the adversary can selectively choose to change ∆ to any value for any honest replica, the adversary
can at any point during the asynchronous phase choose to set ∆ to be the synchronous value; thus, honest
replicas have no way to distinguish between when they are in the asynchronous phase or in the synchronous
phase. The adversary then selectively chooses to send messages or set ∆ to be infinite for messages they
want to drop, following the strategy given in Theorem 4 of [ACD+19]. Thus, BBA cannot be reached in o(n)
multicasts in expectation with any partially synchronous protocol.
We now show that this statement holds with high probability. As we show in Appendix B, there exist a
O(n) multicast protocol that solves BBA with high probability in the partially synchronous (GST) model.
Thus, suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a o(n) multicast protocol that solves BBA with
high probability. Then, in expectation o(n) multicasts are necessary to solve BBA also since the protocol
can always just use the O(n) protocol if the number of multicasts start becoming too large. Thus, we have a
contradiction with our proof above which uses Theorem 4 of [ACD+19] and such a high probability protocol
does not exist.
B Partially Synchronous Binary Byzantine Agreement with Adaptive Ad-
versaries
Although in Section 5, we show that sublinear-multicast binary Byzantine agreement (BBA) is impossible in
the partially synchronous model as defined by [DLS88]. A natural question to ask is whether we can achieve
a linear multicast BBA protocol under adaptive adversaries in the proper partially synchronous model and
then modify it so that it achieves sublinear multicasts for an alternative partially synchronous network model.
Our protocol is inspired by the [ACD+19] protocol in the synchronous model for BBA. We first state the
simple version with O(n) multicast complexity. In Section 7, we modify this protocol to have sublinear
multicast complexity in a slightly different network model. As in [ACD+19] and Section 6, we assume for
simplicity that oracle Fmine exists. Possible instantiations of Fmine are given in Appendix C.1.
Each replica maintains the following states: Ti, b∗i , Fi, Ci, and Ai. Ai is a counter for maintaining the
number of leader messages that a replica has ACKed. b∗i is the current bit that the replica is maintaining. Fi
is a state counter that maintains whether the bit will be changed to the newest bit received from the current
leader or whether the previous bit will be copied over. Ti is the epoch number of the next round the replica
will propose. Ci is the epoch number of the last confirmed round that the replica has seen. A confirmed round
proposal is a round where replica i has seen more than 2n/3 ACKs during that round. This set of > 2n/3
ACKs comprises a certificate for the round.
Challenge 1: Preventing rewinding and fast forwarding It is crucial that the rounds progress so that the
adversary cannot influence leader selection. Since, in the partially synchronous model, we have no way to
synchronize rounds during the asynchronous periods of time, in order to prevent the adversary from advancing
the rounds much too quickly (affording them an advantage in terms of being selected leader), we must be
able to synchronize to the highest round that any honest replica is currently in. We must avoid resetting the
round to a previous round before a round in which an honest replica has already sent out its proposal since
the sequence of leaders will be known to the adversary for that period of time. To fix this problem, we need
to be able to synchronize the replicas to the same round before we send out additional messages.
An adversary might also try to reset the epoch number to a round where there is no honest leader. In this
case, no bits will be proposed and so we are potentially stuck in a repeating cycle of not being able to move
forward because the adversary would always reset to that round. We note that this is not a problem for our
protocol, since each round will be confirmed during the epoch synchronization phase. Thus, any round where
any replica decides to query for a leader token after GST will be used at most twice before the round will
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never be up for confirmation ever again. We do this by syncing to the smallest round after our last confirmed
proposed round. By using this procedure, we simultaneously protect against all three attacks by: introducing
fresh rounds so that the adversary does not have a schedule, increasing the epoch number to avoid becoming
stuck in a round with no honest leader, and ensuring that the adversary does not propose an absurdly large
epoch number for their benefit. More details can be found in Appendix B.2 and Appendix B.3.
Challenge 2: Synchronizing replicas to the same round with processor speeds that differ by Φ The
difficulty of synchronizing the different replicas in the protocol under the adaptive adversary model with
sublinear multicast complexity is that some ‘ticks’ of the clock in the traditional synchronization litera-
ture [CL99, DLS88] might never reach their recipients. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, all
known clock synchronization literature [CL99, DLS88] obtains clock synchronization in O˜(n) multicast
complexity. Thus, for our protocol, we must present a novel clock synchronization technique that could be of
independent interest to future researchers. We first present a simplified version of our linear multicast clock
synchronization protocol in Figure 5 where we give a brief overview, but the details of such an implementation
are provided in Appendix B.1. In Section 7, we modify this protocol to obtain sublinear multicast complexity
in a slightly different network model based on the partially synchronous network model. For our more
complicated protocol described in Section 7, we show that with high probability our protocol uses sublinear
multicast complexity to synchronize to the same round.
B.1 Clock Synchronization under Adaptive Adversaries
We describe and prove the properties of our clock synchronization mechanism in this section. Our clock
synchronization protocol maintains a synchronized epoch number (one can think of the epoch number to be
the clock time) among all replicas while the network remains synchronous. This protocol is inspired by the
clever 3-step confirmation protocol proposed by [YMR+19].
1. i multicasts Round(Si) to all replicas as a message announcing the round it is currently on.
2. i waits for 2∆ + 2Φ time and keeps track of all round messages sent to it while recording the round
message with the smallest epoch number it receives containing a round that is greater than its largest
stored pre-confirmed epoch.
3. If i receives a certificate showing a greater pre-confirmed epoch than the largest pre-confirmed epoch it
stored, then it stores the larger pre-confirmed epoch.
4. After 2(∆ + Φ) time or after it has received ≥ b2n/3c proposed rounds, i sends a signed
Round(S,‘tentative-vote’) message to all other replicas where S is the smallest epoch number
it has received a proposal for (or Si) that is greater than its largest stored pre-confirmed epoch.
5. i waits and records all Round(S,‘tentative-vote’) messages it receives. If i receives at least
2f+1 Round(S,‘tentative-vote’) messages for S, i sends a Round(S,‘pre-confirmed-vote’)
message to all other replicas.
6. i sets its tentative final round to S if it sends out a Round(S,‘pre-confirmed-vote’).
7. i waits and records all Round(S,‘pre-confirmed-vote’) votes it receives. If i receives 2f + 1
votes for S, then i sends the message Round(S,‘confirmed-vote’) and sets its pre-confirmed
epoch to S: P ← S.
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Replica i, set Ci = 0.
While protocol not terminated, for an honest replica i:
1. Multicast Ci + 1 and certificate for Ci (when Ci = 0, no certificate is needed).
2. Wait 2(∆ + Φ) time. Record all Ck seen for k ∈ [2n]. If i sees a certificate for a round j > Ci, i
updates its Ci ← j. Determine the smallest round greater than Ci; let this round be S.
3. Multicast a vote for S.
4. Count votes. If any round receives > b2n/3c votes (where the round ≤ S), set initial round to
this round.
5. Multicast vote for this initial round.
6. Count votes. If the stored initial round gets > b2n/3c votes (where the round ≤ S), set tentative
round to this round.
7. Multicast vote for this tentative round.
8. Count votes. If the stored tentative round gets > b2n/3c votes (where the round ≤ S), set
pre-confirmed epoch to this round. Set Ci to be the new pre-confirmed epoch.
9. Multicast vote for this pre-confirmed epoch.
10. Upon receiving > b2n/3c (including own vote) for the stored pre-confirmed epoch, set confirmed
round to this round. Perform the rest of the protocol only if confirmed round is set.
11. Timeout and restart with Ci + 1 again if any of the above steps take longer than 2(∆ + Φ) time.
Figure 5: Shortened version of the linear multicast simple epoch synchronization protocol.
8. If i sets a pre-confirmed epoch, it resets its largest pre-confirmed epoch counter to be the new pre-
confirmed epoch and records the signatures of the replicas which voted for this new pre-confirmed
epoch as the certificate for this pre-confirmed epoch.
9. i waits and records all Round(S,‘confirmed-vote’) votes it receives. If i receives 2f + 1 votes
for S, then i sets its confirmed round to S.
10. If i sets a confirmed round, i sets Si ← S + 1 and proceeds with the rest of the protocol.
11. If after waiting 2(∆ + Φ) time and not receiving the necessary votes to set a tentative, pre-commit, or
commit round, and if its largest pre-confirmed epoch has not changed, i restarts its synchronization
protocol with step 1, resets Si = P + 1 and multicasts Si (it resets its Si to be bigger than its most
recent pre-commit round P and tries again).
We prove a set of properties for our clock synchronization protocol in the partially synchronous model
under adaptive adversaries that are too strong for our needs, but may be helpful for future work.
Lemma B.1. Adaptive adversaries behave similarly to non-adaptive adversaries in this clock synchronization
protocol.
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Proof. Corrupting a node after seeing some of their messages serves no advantage since additional messages
do not impact vote counting (as honest replicas only count the votes for the smallest round larger than their
pre-committed round). Furthemore, all nodes vote on the smallest round, thus, adaptively preventing a
particular node from voting does not affect the protocol.
Lemma B.2. If a replica executes a part of the protocol that comes after clock synchronization, then at least
f + 1 honest replicas have the same or larger pre-confirmed epoch at that point in time.
Proof. Let time t be the time when the next part of the protocol gets executed (meaning at least one honest
replica has set a confirmed round) with epoch number S. This means that at least 2f + 1 replicas sent a
confirmed vote for the round. Then, at least f + 1 honest replicas sent a confirmed vote (since at most f
replicas are Byzantine) and set their pre-confirmed epoch to S. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that
at most f honest replicas have epoch number Si ≥ S at time t. Then, it must be the case that at least one
of the f + 1 honest replicas voted for a round smaller than S after sending a confirmed vote for S. This is
impossible since they would have stored S as their largest pre-confirmed epoch when proposing Si, and we
have reached a contradiction.
We obtain as an immediate corollary:
Corollary B.3. The protocol after clock synchronization only runs once for every round S.
Proof. Since the pre-commit round for f + 1 honest replicas is at least S by the time the protocol runs for
round S, round S will never be confirmed again (and hence the protocol will never be run again for round
S).
We now prove the liveness of the system after GST.
Lemma B.4. After GST and assuming GST lasts for at least four voting rounds, all honest replicas will have
the same confirmed round and execute the next part of the protocol.
Proof. By induction, we can show that at least one replica will propose a round that is greater than the
greatest stored pre-commit round by any honest replica. Thus, all honest replicas will vote for this proposed
round. After voting three times for this round, all honest replicas will then have the same confirmed round
since all replicas will see all other replicas’ votes.
Theorem B.5. All honest replicas’ clocks will be synchronized to the same round after GST in four rounds,
O(∆) time, and using O(n) multicasts.
Figure 5 is a shortened version of the clock synchronization protocol.
B.2 Warmup Protocol
Using the tools we introduced above and keeping in mind the stated challenges, we now present our complete
binary Byzantine agreement protocol that reaches agreement in O(n) multicasts. We assume here that the
number of total replicas in the network is n where n ≥ 3f + 1 where f is the number of Byzantine replicas
in the network.
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Protocol for replica i:
1. Set Ti = 1 and Fi = 1 at the start of the protocol before receiving any messages from round
leaders (and before sending ACKs). Initialize b∗i to the bit received initially as input before the
protocol starts.
2. The following is performed repeatedly until replica i commits to a bit (outputs a bit):
(a) Run the epoch synchronization process detailed in Figure 5. Only proceed with the rest
of the protocol after becoming synchronized to an epoch. Let S be this confirmed epoch
number.
(b) Flip a random (fair) coin to determine a bit, b. Then, check if Fmine(ski, Propose, S, b) <
D0 for some value D0 to be determined later in our analysis.
(c) If Fmine(ski, Propose, S, b) < D0, multicast (Propose, S, b) and a proof.
(d) After receiving a valid propose (Propose, S, b′) message (and proof piS):
i. Wait δ time (for some δ to be defined in the analysis) to see if it receives another
unconfirmed proposal (Propose, S, b′′) where b′ 6= b′′. If i receives such a proposal,
then i does nothing this round.
ii. Otherwise, set b∗i := b
′ if Fi = 0
iii. Multicast (ACK, S, b∗i ).
(e) If received ≥ b2n/3c ACKs (ACK, S, b′) (from different replicas) where b∗i = b′, set Fi := 1.
(f) If received ≥ b2n/3c ACKs (ACK, S, b′) (from different replicas) where > f of the ACKs are
for b∗i 6= b′, set Fi := 0.
(g) If after δ delay, i eventually received at least b2n/3c ACKs (ACK, S, b), then increment
Ti ← Ti + 1.
(h) At the end of K rounds, i.e. when Ti = K (for some K to be determined later in our
analysis), if Fi = 1, commit to b∗i and return b
∗
i as output bit.
(i) After completing the above protocol, start the epoch synchronization process again.
(j) If after waiting 5δ time, no further step can be taken during any point of the above protocol,
start with the next iteration at the beginning of this loop.
Figure 6: Linear multicast Byzantine Agreement protocol.
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B.3 Warmup Protocol Analysis
We define the round complexity of our protocol to be rounds of communication during the synchronous
period after GST. In our analysis, we assume the following two parameters. Let T be the number of rounds
during the asynchronous period of time before GST. First, we assume that T = O
(
3log
c n
)
for any constant c.
Secondly, we assume that the synchronous period that immediately follows this asynchronous period lasts for
Ω (log T ) rounds.15
Our protocol stated above uses Ω(n) multicast messages. This is not ideal and we fix this assumption
in Section 7 under a somewhat different partially synchronous model. But first, we prove the correctness
and round complexity (and hence multicast complexity) of our simple protocol given above in the partially
synchronous model with an adaptive adversary.
Round Synchronization We first show that after GST, the pre-confirmed epoch number always progresses
forward (i.e. a replica i would never reset Ci to a lower epoch number). See Figure 5 for the epoch
synchronization protocol.
Lemma B.6. After GST, a replica i’s Ci increments by at least 1.
Proof. Suppose a replica i’s Ci = j. After GST, i receives all messages sent by honest replicas. Then, one of
two events can happen:
1. An honest replica k has a Ck where Ck > j (and replica i receives a certificate for Ck). Then, i will
update Ci ← Ck and i has incremented its Ci by at least 1.
2. j ≥ Ck for any other honest replica k. Then, by our epoch synchronization protocol given in Figure 5, i
proposes j + 1 as the new round. Since all other Ck ≤ j, all k will vote for j + 1. Thus, Ci increments
by at least 1.
Thus, by induction, this is true for all values of Ci, provided the base case when Ci is set to 0 initially.
We now show that an adversary cannot selectively choose an arbitrarily large epoch number to synchronize
the clock with high probability.
Lemma B.7. Let the largest pre-confirmed epoch immediately before GST held by any honest replica in
round t of the asynchronous period be C. Then, assuming that the GST ending round t lasts Θ(log T ) rounds,
then the largest pre-confirmed epoch held by any honest replica at the end of GST is O(C + log T ).
Proof. The replica holding the largest pre-confirmed epoch C will propose C + 1 after GST. All honest
replicas will subsequently vote for C + 1 and the largest pre-confirmed round becomes C + 1. We now
prove that during each epoch after GST, the epoch number increases by exactly 1. Suppose for contradiction
that this is not the case. Suppose that Ci > C for replica i increases from Ci to Ci + 2 after one round of
communication after GST. Then, i must not have heard Ci + 1 being proposed in this epoch or a previous
epoch. Since i will increase Ci to Ci + 2, then either it never received a proposal for Ci + 1 or received a
pre-commit certificate for Ci + 1. Either way, this implies that i has not received a proposal for Ci + 1 in the
current epoch or a previous epoch. Since the network becomes synchronous after GST, this is impossible.
Thus, all honest replicas i increase their Ci by at most 1 each round after GST.
Therefore, since the total number of rounds after GST is Θ(log T ), the largest confirmed epoch number
held by any honest replica at the end of GST will be O(C + log T ).
15This assumption is similar to the assumption assumed by [GHM+17].
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Lemma B.8. Let the largest pre-confirmed epoch at the start of the protocol held by any honest replica be
C. Assuming that the period of asynchrony lasts T = O
(
3log
c n
)
rounds and GST lasts Θ(log T ) rounds,
the largest pre-confirmed epoch held by any honest replica at the start of the first round after GST is
O (C + T + log T ).
Proof. The largest pre-confirmed epoch cannot increase by more than 1 following any communication round.
Let the largest pre-confirmed epoch held by any replica at round j ≤ T be K. Then, no replica at the start of
round j + 1 holds a certificate to pre-confirmed epoch K + 1. Thus, no replica will vote for round K + 2
since all replicas will propose round ≤ K + 1. Hence, the largest pre-confirmed epoch cannot increase by
more than 1 following any communication round even during periods of asynchrony. Since the period of
asynchrony lasts T rounds, at the start of GST, the largest pre-confirmed epoch held by any honest replica
will be O(C + T ). By Lemma B.7, the largest pre-confirmed epoch held by any honest replica after GST
will be O (C + T + log T ).
The way the adversary can take advantage of epoch synchronization for their benefit is to synchronize to
an epoch where a large number of Byzantine replicas become leaders before the necessary number of rounds
of honest leaders occur. In such cases, honest replicas could be prevented from reaching consensus for longer
than polylogarithmic number of rounds. We first present here a lemma that we later use in our argument that
such a case most likely will not occur with high probability.
Lemma B.9. Let the period of asynchrony be O(T ) rounds. Then, the probability that X consecutive rounds
in this period of asynchrony have at least one Byzantine leader during each of the X rounds is upper bounded
by T (2fD0)
X where D0 is defined in Figure 6.
Proof. Given that there are at most f Byzantine replicas (where there are at least n ≥ 3f + 1 total replicas)
at any point in time and each has two chances to become a leader for any round (once for bit 0 and another
chance for bit 1), the probability that a Byzantine replica proposes a bit in any round is at most 2fD0 where
D0 ≤ 1 is our threshold for proposing a bit. Given a particular starting round, the probability that the next X
consecutive rounds have at least one Byzantine replica proposing a bit is (2fD0)
X . By the union bound over
all possible starting rounds in the period of asynchrony, the probability that there exists such a sequence of X
rounds is upper bounded by T (2fD0)
X .
Using the above we show that if the period after GST is sufficiently long, then we synchronize to a round
with no Byzantine leaders with high probability.
Lemma B.10. Let the period of asynchrony be O(T ) rounds. Then, with high probability, the protocol
reaches a round with no Byzantine leaders in O
(
log 1
2fD0
(nT )
)
rounds after GST (assuming f > 0).
Proof. By Lemma B.9, the probability that there exists a period of X rounds where at least one adversarial
leader exists in each of the X rounds is T (2fD0)
X . We want the smallest X where T (2fD0)
X ≤ 1nc for
all constant c by which we obtain with high probability an epoch with no Byzantine leaders after X epoch
after GST (since the adversarial strategy is to synchronize the epoch to the beginning of the X epochs after
GST). Solving for X , we obtain, X ≥ c log1/2fD0 (n) + log1/2fD0 (T ).
Now we show that we synchronize to a round with exactly one honest leader.
Lemma B.11. Let D0 = 1/2n and the period of asynchrony be O(T ) rounds. Then, with high probability,
the protocol reaches a round with exactly one honest leader in O (log (nT ) + log n) rounds after GST.
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Proof. By Lemma B.10, we obtain a round with no Byzantine leaders with high probability in O (log (nT ))
rounds after GST if we assume D0 = 1/2n. By the Chernoff bound, with high probability, exactly one
honest leader will exist after O(log n) rounds. Thus, exactly one honest leader exists in a round after GST in
O (log (nT ) + log n) rounds.
Lemma B.12. Round synchronization using sublinear number of rounds to a round with exactly one honest
leader occurs with high probability after GST if we assume the period of asynchrony lasts O
(
3n
)
rounds
assuming D0 = 1/2n and for all 0 <  < 1.
Proof. By Lemma B.11, the number of rounds required before reaching a round with exactly one honest leader
is O (log (nT ) + log n). Setting T = 3n

, we obtain that the number of rounds required before reaching an
epoch with exactly one honest leader is O (n + log n), which is sublinear if we assume 0 <  < 1.
Corollary B.13. Epoch synchronization using polylogarithmic number of rounds to an epoch with exactly one
honest leader occurs with high probability after GST if we assume the period of asynchrony lasts O
(
3log
c n
)
rounds assuming D0 = 1/2n and for all constants c ≥ 0.
Consistency within an epoch. In this section, we show that if two replicas receive sufficiently many votes
for their bits b∗i and b
∗
j , then b
∗
i = b
∗
j .
Lemma B.14. Suppose a forever honest replica i observed ≥ b2n/3c ACKs from a set of replicas S for b∗i
and forever honest replica j also receives ≥ b2n/3c ACKs from replica set S′ for b∗j . Then, at least one
forever honest replica exists in S ∩ S′ and b∗i = b∗j .
Proof. We prove this via contradiction. Suppose that honest replica i observed ≥ b2n/3c ACKs from a set
of replicas S for b∗i and forever honest replica j also receives ≥ b2n/3c ACKs from replica set S′ for b∗j but
b∗i 6= b∗j . By the assumptions of our network model, this means that at least b2n/3c+ 1 replicas voted for b∗i
and a disjoint set of at least bn/3c+ 1 replicas voted for b∗j 6= b∗i since honest replicas vote at most once per
round and there exists at most bn/3c Byzantine replicas in the network. Thus, the total number of replicas in
the network must be > n, a contradiction. Therefore, by the pigeonhole principle, there exists at least one
forever-honest replica in the set S ∩ S′.
Termination in O (log (nT ) + log n) rounds after GST with high probability. After GST, the various
Ci and Cj for honest replicas i and j might be de-synced. Suppose D0 = 12n , we show that with high
probability, there exists an epoch Ri where some honest replicas see ≥ b2n/3c ACKs on a single bit after
O (log (nT ) + log n) rounds after GST assuming the period of asynchrony lasted O(T ) rounds. If all honest
replicas start with the same input bit b, then, with high probability, after O (log (nT ) + log n) rounds, all
replicas will output b. It takes O
(
∆·D0
δ
)
proposal messages before all replicas are synced to the same epoch,
the smallest epoch that has not been pre-committed. Let this round be Rk. Setting δ to be on the order of ∆,
we obtain O(1) rounds after GST after which the replicas will be synced to the same epoch. This is proven in
the following lemma:
Lemma B.15. If δ = Θ(∆), after O(1) rounds after GST, all replicas will be synced to the same epoch with
O(n) multicasts using the distributed clock protocol presented in Figure 5.
Proof. After GST, let ` be the smallest round for which a replica sends a proposal that has not been pre-
confirmed. After ∆ delay, all replicas receive the message with round ` attached. By definition of `, there
does not exist a proposal that has not been confirmed that is smaller than `. After ∆ delay, all replicas receive
the proposal `. Since no honest replicas have pre-confirmed `, all honest replicas will vote for ` until ` is
confirmed. Because there are at most 3 rounds of voting and one round of proposal and during each of these
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communication rounds each honest replica only sends one message, if δ = Θ(∆), after O(1) rounds after
GST, all replicas will be synced to the same round with multicast complexity O(n).
Lemma B.16. Suppose δ ≈ ∆ and D0 = 1/2n. All honest replicas will multicast ACK for at least one honest
proposal in O (poly log n) rounds after GST with high probability.
Proof. Let ` be the first round where (a) there exists exactly one leader and (b) the one leader is an
honest replica. The probability that this occurs in any particular round is ≥ (2n3 ) ( 12n) (1− 12n)n−1 ≥(
1
3
) (
2n√
e(2n−1)
)
≥ 16 . Then, after GST, ` occurs at least once in O(log n) rounds (after all replicas are
synced) with probability at least ≥ 1 − (56)c logn ≥ 1 − 1nc for any constant c > 0. Since all replicas are
now synced and there is only one leader and it is honest, all honest replicas will ACK the honest proposal.
Suppose T = O
(
3log
c n
)
for any constant c > 0, by Lemma B.11 and what we showed above, a total of
O (poly log n) rounds are necessary for all honest replicas to multicast ACK for at least one honest proposal
after GST with high probability.
A good epoch exists in O(log n) rounds where only one honest leader proposes a bit with high prob-
ability. We define good epochs similarly to the definition given in [ACD+19] except for the partially
synchronous model. Let h be an honest leader in EPOCHi. Then, given that h passes the test for sending a
proposal (and since the probability of picking a bit and of sending a proposal are independent), h chooses a
lucky bit b∗ (uniformly at random) iff either 1) in EPOCHi − 1, no honest replicas have seen 2n3 ACKs for its
own bit; or 2) in EPOCHi − 1, some honest replicas have seen 2n3 ACKs for its own bit and this bit equals b∗.
The honest leader h chooses a lucky bit b∗ with probability at least 1/2. Thus in O(log n) epochs where only
one honest leader proposes a bit, a good epoch exists with 1− 1nc probability for all constant c > 0.
Persistence of honest choice after a good epoch. Once we have a good epoch EPOCHi as defined above,
all honest replicas will ACK b∗ during EPOCHi. Once all honest replicas have the same b∗i , then they will never
set their Fi = 0 again. Thus, they will ACK b∗ for all future rounds. By induction, in all future epochs they
will stick to ACKing b∗.
Validity If all honest replicas receive the same bit b∗ as input then no honest replica will set Fi = 0 and b∗
will be output by all honest replicas.
Using the above, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem B.17. Binary Byzantine agreement can be reached in O(poly log n) rounds after GST with high
probability and with O(n) multicast complexity assuming the asynchronous period lasts for no more than
O
(
3log
c n
)
rounds.
Proof. By Lemma B.10, Corollary B.13, and Lemma B.15, we can achieve a round with one leader who
is honest after O(poly log n) rounds after GST with high probability. Then, by Lemma B.16, after O(1)
additional communication rounds, we achieve consensus on one bit.
C Constructions of Fmine
Our protocols in Section 6 and Section 7 require that Fmine be a signing oracle that has the following
properties:
1. With all but negligible probability in κ, no other replica j 6= i can predict the output of Fmine(ski, x)
on the secret key for replica i and input x without querying Fmine.
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2. An output from Fmine can be verified by all other replicas (the output from Fmine may include an
additional proof).
3. The output of Fmine is a value generated uniformly at random in [0, 1].
There are several instantiations of such functions. One of these instantiations is via verifiable random
functions (VRFs) as described in Appendix C.1. Another instantiation is the nice real-world cryptographic
construction presented in Appendix D of [ACD+19] using PRFs and adaptively-secure NIZKs.
C.1 Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)
In this section, we provide the full, formal definition of VRFs as provided in [MVR99] and then a brief
description of how to use such a function for our cryptographic sortition signature oracle Fmine.
Definition C.1 (Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs) [MVR99]). Let (G,F, V ) be a set of three polytime
algorithms. The function generator G (1κ) → (pki, ski) outputs a public key/private key pair (pki, ski)
which are two binary strings. The function evaluator F = (F1, F2) is a two-part function that each takes as
input the secret key ski and an input x and outputs a value ρ
F1←− (ski, x) and a proof pi F2←− (ski, x). The
function verifier V takes as input {Y es,No} V←− (pki, x, ρ, pi) and outputs Y es or No.
Let a : N → N ∪ {∗} and b, s : N → N be any three functions such that a(κ), b(κ), s(κ) are all
computable in time poly(κ) and a(κ) and b(κ) are both bounded by a polynomial in κ (except when a(κ)
takes on the value ∗ which means the set of all binary values).
(G,F, V ) is a verifiable pseudorandom function (VRF) with input length a(κ), output length b(κ), and
security s(κ) where κ is the security parameter if the following properties hold:
1. Domain-Range Correctness and Provability: The following conditions hold for all but negligible
probability in κ (negl(κ)):
(a) For all x ∈ {0, 1}a(κ), F1(ski, x) ∈ {0, 1}b(κ).
(b) For all x ∈ {0, 1}a(κ), if (ρ, pi) F←− (ski, x), then P[V (pki, x, ρ, pi) = Y es] > 1− negl(κ).
2. Unique Provability: For every pki, x, ρ1, ρ2, pi1, pi2 such that ρ1 6= ρ2, the following holds for either
g = 1 or g = 2:
P[V (pki, x, ρg, pig) = Y es] < negl(κ).
3. Pseudorandomness: Given a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithmA = (AE ,AT ) that both
run for at most s(κ) steps when their first inputs are 1κ and does not query the oracle F (ski, ·) for x,
then A succeeds in the following experiment with probability 1/2 + negl(κ):
(a) Run G(1κ) to obtain (pki, ski).
(b) Run AF (ski,·)E (1κ, pki)→ (x, state).
(c) Choose b R←− {0, 1}.
i. If b = 0, let ρ F1←− (ski, x).
ii. If b = 1, let ρ R←− {0, 1}b(κ).
(d) Run AF (sk,·)T (1κ, ρ, state) to obtain guess.
(e) A = (AE ,AT ) succeeds if x ∈ {0, 1}a(k), guess = b, and A did not query F (ski, x).
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Intuitively, VRFs are functions which takes as input a secret key ski and some arbitrary function input x
and returns an output ρx and a proof pix. Using the input x, output ρx, proof pix, and public key pki, anyone
can verify quickly that the VRF was computed (using the player’s secret key). Furthermore, an adversary
cannot guess the output of the VRF without computing it except with negligible probability in our security
parameter κ. This means that an adversary cannot guess (except with negligible probability) the output of
anyone’s VRF without knowing their secret key.
There are many instantiations of verifiable random functions (some from standard assumptions) (e.g.
[Dod02, DY05, HJ16]). The proof sizes of many of these constructions are O(κ). Thus, the cost in bits of
sending these proofs in messages is essentially the same as that necessary to send a signature using a standard
PKI.
D Verifiable Delay Functions (VDFs)
The formal definition of VDFs is presented below.
Definition D.1 (Verifiable Delay Functions [BBBF18]). A VDF V = (Setup, Eval, Verify) is a triple of
algorithms that perform the following:
1. Setup(κ,D) → pp = (ek, vk): The Setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter κ and a
desired difficulty level D and produces public parameters consisting of an evaluation key ek and a
verification key vk. Setup is polynomial time with respect to κ and D is subexponentially-sized in
terms of κ. The public parameters specify an input space X and an output space Y . X is efficiently
sampleable. If secret randomness is used in Setup, a trusted setup might be necessary.
2. Eval(ek, x)→ (y, pi): Eval takes an input x ∈ X (in the sample space of inputs) and the evaluation
key and produces an output y ∈ Y (in the sample space of outputs) and a (possibly empty) proof pi.
Eval may use random bits to generate pi but not to compute y. Eval runs in parallel time D even
when given poly(log(D), κ) processors for all pp generated by Setup(κ,D) and x ∈ X .
3. Verify(vk, x, y, pi) → {Y es,No}: Verify is a deterministic algorithm that takes the verification
key vk, an input x, the output y, and proof pi and outputs Y es or No depending on whether y was
correctly computed from via Eval. Eval runs in time poly(log(D), κ).
Furthermore, V must satisfy the following properties:
1. Correctness A VDF V is correct if for all κ,D, parameters (ek, vk) R←− Setup(κ,D), and all x ∈ X ,
if (y, pi) R←− Eval(ek, x), then Verify(vk, x, y, pi)→ Y es.
2. Soundness A VDF is sound if for all algorithms A that run in time O (poly(D,κ))
P
 Verify(vk, x, y, pi) = Y es
y′ 6= y
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
pp = (ek, vk)
R←− Setup(κ,D)
(x, y′, pi′) R←− A (κ,pp, D)
(y, pi)
R←− Eval(ek, x)
 ≤ negl(κ).
3. Sequentiality A VDF is (p, σ)-sequential if no adversary A = (A0,A1) with a pair of randomized
algorithms A0, which runs in total time O(poly(D,κ)), and A1, which runs in parallel time σ(t) on
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at most p(t) processors, can win the following game with probability greater than negl(κ):
pp R←− Setup(κ,D)
L
R←− A0(κ, pp, D)
x
R←− X
yA
R←− A1(L, pp, x).
A = (A0,A1) wins the game if (y, pi) R←− Eval(ek, x) and yA = y.
For the VDFs used in our constructions, we use more efficient VDFs that provide tighter time bounds
than the bounds given by the definition of VDFs above. More specifically, we consider VDF constructions
where the definition of sequentiality p is for any polynomial and σ(t) = t− t for some sufficiently small
constant (but we even prove our protocol secure for any constant gap between the speeds of the adversary and
the honest party).
There are several well-known VDF constructions in the literature [BBBF18, Pie19, Wes19], most of
which use exponentiation but some use other methods [BDRV19, EFKP19, FMPS19]. Because some of
these constructions uses public-coin setup and public-coin succinct arguments for proving the correctness of
the output, one can use the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic to make the proofs non-interactive; hence, the VDFs used
in our protocol in Section 6 include such proofs as part of the output. The proof sizes of these constructions
are generally O(poly(κ)) or even, O(logD) (see e.g. [Pie19, Wes19, FMPS19]).
E Additional Background
Consensus protocols have been studied since the 1980s as a method to provide fault tolerance for information
stored in databases [DLS88, CL99]. Such protocols achieve fault tolerance by distributing data and computa-
tion across many different machines which are physically separated from one another over a network; they
aim to achieve safety, where participants agree on the same committed values and each has a copy of the
same history of committed values, and liveness, where progress is continuously being made to increase the
log of committed values. The state machine replication (SMR) model is a type of consensus model where
many different copies of a machine, called replicas, run the same protocol and communicate with one another
via communication channels to create a common log. Such protocols are often formulated in models where
there exist both a communication delay and desynchronized clocks [DLS88]; such models accurately depict
certain scenarios in the real-world. Throughout this paper, we refer to obtaining consensus in the SMR model,
simply, as consensus and consensus protocols in the SMR model as consensus protocols.
E.1 Network Models
Consensus protocols are often studied in various models that are designed to reflect network conditions in the
real-world.
Some network models [DLS88] consider cases where in addition to message delay, replicas can have
internal clocks that run at different speeds, causing the clocks held by replicas to be desynchronized. Usually,
we are concerned with the case where network clocks are desynchronized by at most Φ, where all processors
take at least one step in any size Φ block of time. Although there are standard techniques for synchronizing
the clocks held by processors [DLS88], in cases of unknown message delay, such techniques require Ω(n2)
message complexity (or Ω(n) multicast complexity) which is too large for the settings we consider in
this paper. As is the case with more recent research on communication-efficient protocols secure against
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adaptive adversaries [ACD+19, CPS19, GHM+17], we will only consider communication delay/asynchrony
in this paper without considering processor delay or processor asynchrony as real-world networks often
exhibit synchronized global clocks. In the case of our impossibility results, since we consider a stronger
communication model, our results also hold for the case when processors exhibit different speeds bounded by
Φ. In the future, we intend to extend our protocols to also account for the case when processor speeds also
differ by some bounded Φ.
Abstracting the conditions of the real-world gives us three main network models:
Synchronous The synchronous model is a model where all messages sent by honest nodes are expected to
arrive (at honest nodes) after ∆ delay.
Asynchronous The asynchronous model is a model where the message delay is unbounded. This means
that messages can be dropped at any point in the protocol.
Partially Synchronous The partially synchronous model is a model where there exists an unknown (but
bounded) period of time during which the network is asynchronous. After Global Stabilization Time (GST),
the network becomes synchronous with network message delay ∆.
Although there are other network models, we do not consider them in this paper and, thus do not expand
upon them here. In Section 7 we introduce a new network model in which the adversary can drop messages
with some fixed probability p.
E.2 Adversarial Strategies and Advantages
An adaptive adversary can perform a number of actions to maximize their advantage over the honest replicas
which correctly follow the prescribed protocol. For example, if the leader election schedule is predictable,
the adversary can immediately corrupt the leader before they are elected, reducing chain quality or censoring
proposals. In committee election systems, 16 the committee is typically much smaller than the tolerated
number of faults. Once the adversary sees the committee they can immediately corrupt the entire committee.
Previous work solved this problem via the memory-erasure model [GHM+17]. However, erasure is hard to
perform in real-life systems, and furthermore, without a proof-of-erasure it is not possible to check whether
such an erasure was actually performed. Thus, it is ideal to remove such an assumption when protecting
against this form of attack. We call this type of attack key reuse:
Key Reuse Without the memory-erasure model, an adversary can sign multiple messages as the replica
once it is corrupted. In the adaptive adversary setting with leader election, the adversary can wait to see who
sends messages as the leader and then immediately corrupt that replica to send out many different proposals,
splitting votes and preventing consensus. In protocols which elect committees, the adversary can similarly
wait to see who sends messages as a committee member and then immediately corrupt those replicas to vote
for multiple proposals, violating safety.
One way to address this is vote-specific eligibility—election is tied to the proposed value, so even a
corrupted replica cannot vote for two values. In these protocols, the adversary can use computational power
to get unfairly elected to the committee. In the case of public ledgers, honest replicas will only propose
proposals sent to them by clients. This means that honest replicas, which gossip only the proposals they
receive, do not have a disproportionate chance to become part of the committee. However, the adversary can
16 A committee election system is one where voting and block proposals are performed only by members of a committee which is
elected uniformly at random.
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create and try many different arbitrary proposals, for example spending coins back to itself, to increase the
chances that Byzantine replicas are elected to committees. We formally define this process as vote grinding:
Vote Grinding In previous work [ACD+19, CPS19], the election of a replica to be leader or to a voting
committee is dependent probabilitistically on the specific proposal/vote proposed by the replica (chosen
with uniform probability over all proposals). An adversary can choose to try many proposals in parallel to
attempt to obtain a large number of Byzantine replicas in the committee. Even though the probability of a
replica being elected to a committee is small, the chances of a set of Byzantine replicas of sufficient size
being part of the committee approaches 1 as the number of proposals tried increases. Since the proposed
adversarial proposals are not tied to real proposals requested by clients, the adversary can try a much larger
set of proposals than the total number of proposals requested by clients in the network. We call this form of
attack vote grinding.
In our paper, we protect against both attacks above without the use of the memory-erasure model in the
synchronous model. We hope that such techniques could be applied to the partially-synchronous setting as
studied in previous works [GHM+17]. However, one must limit the number of rounds the asynchronous
phase can last due to the following possible attack:
Fast-forwarding In protocols with leader and committee election (assuming committee size is 3λ+ 1 for
some λ), there is some execution where, given an adversary that has corrupted f replicas, the leader chosen
will happen to be one of the f or the committee chosen will consist of too many adversarial members. The
adversary can try to set the clock to a round number where a long sequence of proposers and committee
members are all adversarial (i.e. they are dominated by the f nodes currently controlled by the adversary).
The probability that any X consecutive rounds has > λ3 adversaries in the committee from a given set of
f adversarial nodes is ≥
(
f
n
) (λ+3)X
3
> 0 when X is finite (recall that the committees consist of 3λ + 1
members now instead of 3f + 1). Thus, by the probabilistic method, such a set of X consecutive rounds is
guaranteed to hold for some finite consecutive round numbers. Because such a long sequence is unlikely to
occur in polylogarithmic number of rounds, in the synchronous model we can still achieve consensus with
high probability. However, in the partially synchronous model, the adversary can drop or delay messages
arbitrarily during the asynchronous period until GST. If we assume that the adversary has computing power
bounded by a large enough polynomial, we should also assume they are able to find this consecutive sequence.
During a long enough asynchronous period the adversary can drop messages and force repeated elections
until a leader and committee are elected where it has this specific advantage. At this point the adversary can
propose and vote for multiple proposals during multiple consecutive rounds, eventually violating safety.
Partitioning committees During the asynchronous parts of the partially synchronous model, the adversary
has complete control of the network, e.g. when messages are sent and received. This means that it is possible
that some nodes might believe that other nodes have agreed on a bit while others believe they have agreed on
a different bit. In fact, we show that is it impossible to know when all nodes have agreed on the same bit in
BBA using sublinear multicasts in this model in Section 5.
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